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Results of North Atlantic Council's Eleventh Meeting

ADDRESS BY SECRETARY DULLES¹

Last Monday [April 27] I returned from 5 working days in Europe with Secretary Humphrey, Secretary Wilson, and Governor Stassen. We went to attend the meeting of the Council of NATO. We have reported to the President and to the Congress and now I report to you.

First let me, for background, recall what NATO is. NATO is the grand alliance of 14 nations that was created under the North Atlantic Treaty. That treaty was adopted 4 years ago as a bipartisan act to prevent a third world war coming out of Europe. The administration was then Democratic, but Republicans in the Senate, of which I was then one, took an active part in bringing about Senate consent to ratification. Then, in 1950, General Eisenhower was called to be the first Supreme Commander of the NATO forces in Europe. So he knows a great deal about it. It was indeed his vision, energy, and inspiration which largely converted this organization from a paper blueprint into a solid bulwark which already has tremendous protective value to the United States.

Let me recall what this value is. Suppose, for example, that Western Europe were overrun by the Red armies so that the Soviet world included all of Europe. That would so shift the balance of industrial power that we would be in great peril. Take steel production as an example, because steel is a basic commodity. Today we and our allies have an advantage of about three to one over the Communist world. But if Western Europe were shifted from the free world side to the Red side of the ledger, then the steel ratio would be about 50-50. Under those circumstances the Soviet leaders would be much more likely to attack us than is the case today.

Of course, our concern is much more than material. Europe is the cradle of our civilization and dear to many of us as the home of our ancestors. It would be a terrible blow, spiritually and morally, if Europe's religion and culture were to be stamped out by ruthless atheism.

We could not and would not sit idly by in the face of such an attack on Europe. So it is a case

where we should seek prevention which is cheaper than cure, as two world wars have taught us. NATO is prevention, we hope, against a repetition of 1914 and 1939.

NATO now has approximately 50 divisions in Western Europe and there are more than 25 divisions in the southern flank of Greece and Turkey. Some of these units are not fully trained and equipped and there is still much to be done to get maximum combat effectiveness. Nevertheless the existing forces have great value as a deterrent to aggression. Europe is not yet fully secure, but it is no longer a "pushover," so weak that it is a temptation to others to seize it by an act of war.

At last week's NATO meeting we tried to find practical ways of making NATO even stronger. We went at this with some new ideas, largely drawn from President Eisenhower's own personal experience and judgment.

Combat Effectiveness To Be Increased

1. We sought military strength which would be borne out of economic health, not economic sickness. The European members have been straining toward a theoretical goal and now they are beginning to get out of breath. Since we cannot foresee the year of greatest danger, President Eisenhower believes that it is safest to adopt a pace which can be maintained with growing strength, rather than run the risk of dropping exhausted by the wayside before the haven is reached. Therefore, at this NATO meeting we put our emphasis on getting greater strength by less costly methods. This can be done by improving quality, rather than by seeking an immediate large increase in quantity. In a world of toughness, it is better to be compact and hard rather than to be big and soft. There will be a steady NATO build-up, but in the main this year's and next year's added strength will come through improved quality. That will tend to relieve the excessive strain which has been placed upon the budgets and currencies of some of the countries, including our own. At the same time there will be a big lift in NATO's combat effectiveness. You can figure this to be as much as 30 percent this year.

¹ Made over radio and television networks on Apr. 29 (press release 225).

2. We sought to fill the big gap in European defense which is the present lack of German forces. This gap in the center cannot be made good by any effort, however great, put forward by the other countries. Further, I do not believe that Americans, or British, or French want to anticipate fighting to defend Germany while the Germans look on as spectators. At present Germans are only spectators because the surrender terms do not authorize Germany to have any armed forces.

The continental European countries themselves thought out a solution which was to make agreements largely restoring West Germany's sovereignty and permitting Germans to rearm not just as German national forces, which might serve national ambitions, but as part of a single European Defense Community. This in turn would fit into NATO's defense plans.

These agreements were signed almost a year ago, but still they have not yet been brought into force. At this NATO Council meeting I introduced a resolution calling for the prompt creation of the European Defense Community (Edc). This was unanimously adopted.

All of the Edc governments are fully aware of the importance of early action. But in each of the countries there are parliamentary delays. This strains our patience. But it should not break it. There is no other good solution of the problem of establishing adequate strength and peace in Europe, as the cabinets realize and I trust that the parliaments too will accept that same view during the coming months.

3. We put great emphasis on what is called "infrastructure." That is a strange new word, which has come to have great importance. It means the network of facilities in one country available for NATO forces drawn from different countries. This requires that airfields, pipelines, supply depots, radio communication, radar and the like, in each country, be made available to many national forces on a common basis. In past years, there has been long haggling about working this out. This time we found agreement on a 3-year program for developing this "infrastructure." At moderate cost, it will add enormously to the efficiency of the existing forces. For example, it will create 50 new airfields in a year for common use in Europe. There can be a dispersion and deployment of aircraft on the ground, so that all will not be the concentrated target of a few bombs. And if some airfields are bombed out, there will be alternate fields, well equipped, on which planes aloft can land and take off. This will make NATO forces much more effective and secure.

4. We gave much thought to new tactical weapons, and to the increased power which they can give to the defense of Europe. We are starting some NATO training in these matters with due regard to security.

Talks With Military Leaders

Just before leaving Paris, I talked at length with two of the top military leaders of NATO, General Ridgway and his Chief of Staff, General Gruenther. Naturally, they would like more land and air strength and they are particularly anxious to see the defense forces rounded out with German contingents. However, they believe that today there is enough strength so that if the Soviets planned to overrun Europe, it would be necessary for them first largely to re-enforce the Red armies now in or near Eastern Germany. This, they could not do without our knowledge. This fact alone is of great importance. It means that we would probably get the opportunity to bring into final readiness counter measures both in Europe and elsewhere, which might in fact deter the actual assault and preserve the peace.

What I have said gives you a good idea of what went on at our formal NATO meetings. Outside of these meetings, we talked informally and directly with most of the members. We did not talk to them as though NATO were just our responsibility and not theirs. After all, NATO is a joint enterprise, and it has its primary location in Europe.

Also we discussed with the British and the French, among others, the matter of general economic aid from the United States. Some call it a "hand-out." That is hardly fair, because the United States has gained intangible, if not specific, benefits.

Americans have always generously responded to emergency needs. But outright grants ought to be reserved only for real emergencies. They are a kind of crutch which may be needed from time to time. But as soon as there is economic health and the opportunity for a people to earn their way by their own efforts, then the crutch ought to be thrown away. We believe that this is becoming increasingly possible.

We talked over that viewpoint with our friends in Europe. We found that they welcomed a relationship which would be dignified and self-respecting for all concerned. There are plenty of ways whereby the British and French and others can contribute in Europe or Asia to special efforts which are in the common interest. Then they will be more and more earning their way.

We shall still be spending substantial sums, and these friendly countries do not need to anticipate too great reduction in their dollar income. But our Government will be specifically getting, for the dollars it spends abroad, what may enable it to save in other security measures and thus, on balance, get more security for less money.

At this last week's NATO Council meeting, in the ways I indicated, there came into NATO a transforming spirit. The full effect will only be apparent in later years as we look back. But as we look forward, we can anticipate that NATO will

never grow into an organization which sucks the life blood out of the member countries, but rather be the shield behind which confidence will grow to invigorate all of the protected nations.

It has been said that the proper role of military strength is to give time for moral ideas to take root. The role of NATO is to enable the great moral and spiritual principles of Western civilization to take root and blossom again after the ravages of two world wars. That was the conception of those Americans who, without regard to party, joined with the other free peoples to create the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. That is the conception for which so many Americans, without regard to party, have given their dedicated efforts. That is the conception which we believe is now nearing realization.

President Eisenhower, in the message which he sent through us to the NATO Council, said, "NATO has become a mighty force for peace and an instrument of enduring cooperation among the Atlantic peoples." As such it greatly increases what the President, in his challenging address, called "the chance for peace."²

TEXT OF FINAL COMMUNIQUE ISSUED APRIL 25

1. The North Atlantic Council, meeting in Paris in Ministerial Session with the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Defence, Economics and Finance present, and under the chairmanship of Lord Ismay, completed their work today.

2. The Council agreed on short and long-term programmes for NATO. They established a firm military programme for 1953 and a provisional programme for 1954. In addition to the forces which Greece and Turkey are contributing, there will be a notable increase in the size of the forces assigned to NATO Supreme Commanders and a considerable improvement in their effectiveness. Training is being greatly improved at all levels. The series of large-scale manoeuvres held during the last year has appreciably raised the standard of co-operation of the forces of the member countries; units are being better equipped and the organization of support forces is developing. The NATO military authorities consider that the attainment of the force goals in 1953, and the combined influence of these various factors, will add materially to the defensive strength of NATO during 1953.

3. Agreement was reached not only on the common financing of the second part (£67,000,000) to the Fourth Slice of the Infrastructure Programme (the first part to the amount of about £80,000,000 having been settled at a Ministerial Meeting in December), but also on a cost-sharing formula which would cover future programmes to be submitted by the Supreme Commanders for the three-year period beginning in 1954, involving expendi-

"A Mighty Force for Peace"

Following is the text of a message from President Eisenhower which Secretary Dulles read to the members of the North Atlantic Council at the opening of their eleventh meeting on April 23:

On the occasion of this important meeting I send my personal greetings to the North Atlantic Council. As you know, I have long held the deep conviction that the success of NATO's program was essential to world peace and to the security and well-being of all Atlantic nations. My subsequent experience has reinforced and strengthened this belief. NATO has become a mighty force for peace and an instrument of enduring cooperation among the Atlantic peoples.

We deplore the fact that civilized nations are compelled at this stage of human history to devote so large a portion of their energies and resources to the purpose of military defense. I have already expressed my hope that it will be possible in the foreseeable future to devote part of these resources and energies to more constructive purposes. I know that this can be accomplished if all nations will co-operate sincerely in creating the necessary conditions for lasting peace. But until the conditions for genuine peace have been firmly established it would be foolhardy for us to delude ourselves about the dangers confronting us. It is still the foremost task of free governments to develop sufficient economic, defensive, and moral strength to make certain that our civilization is spared the horror and devastation of another world war.

All honest men know that NATO has no intention of aggression and that we seek only enough strength to deter aggression by others. We cannot afford to seek less.

As this meeting opens there is an opportunity for mankind to move forward toward a new era of peace and progress. The realization of this opportunity will depend primarily upon the deeds of others. But our own task is clear. While we carry the hope of peace in our hearts unblemished by self-delusion or wishful thinking, we will also employ the skill of our minds and hands to make this hope a living reality. Throughout the changing and unpredictable events of future months and years we will remain steadfast in purpose and united in action.

A quotation from Lincoln seems to have particular significance for our situation of today. We have malice toward none. We have charity for all peoples. But we will remain firmly determined to do the right as God gives us to see the right and will strive on to finish the work we have begun.

ture of up to £250,000,000, subject to the approval of Parliaments. These programmes will include a wide range of projects such as airfields, telecommunications, naval bases and port facilities, pipelines and radar installations. The military authorities of NATO now have a financial planning figure to which they can work for over three years. In addition, an improved system is ready to be put into operation to ensure closer financial supervision over the expenditure of common infrastructure funds.

4. The Council gave close attention to various economic and financial factors affecting the rate of expansion of the defence efforts. It was agreed that the development of sound national economies

² BULLETIN of Apr. 27, 1953, p. 599.

and the increase of military forces should be pursued concurrently; in certain fields the establishment of long-term joint military production programmes appeared to be the least costly and the most efficient solution.

5. It was on these lines that the Member Governments and the International Staff developed a method for preparing correlated production programmes. The object of this is both to ensure that the defence production undertaken by European countries within their own budgets is on the most economic lines and to make defence production in Europe more effective. The participation of the United States, through off-shore procurement, adds to the contribution of the European countries and plays a very important part in these achievements. The additional fighter aircraft production programme, which has recently been announced is a first important result of this. It will facilitate the expansion of the aircraft industries in five European countries while at the same time strengthening the air defence capacity of the Alliance. Other programmes are being considered. NATO is also studying the means of developing production in Europe of spare parts for the maintenance of equipment of American and Canadian origin.

6. The Secretary General's Progress Report to the Council stressed the close collaboration between the civilian and military agencies of NATO, and outlined the current work of the International Staff. It emphasised the importance of developing a better public understanding of the aims and achievements of NATO, a matter to which Governments should give their constant attention. The Report described the progress made in the many and varied technical studies by Committees of the Council in a number of widely different fields, such as civil defence and other aspects of civil organization in time of war.

In the course of discussion on the Report, the Council re-emphasised their interest in the NATO countries' co-operation in the economic, cultural and social fields. They noted with satisfaction the initiative taken by the President of the United States of America, recently announced, with a view to fostering the solution of over-population problems in certain countries.³

7. The Council continued their regular practice of exchanging views on political matters of common concern. In reviewing the international situation they were in full agreement. This agreement included their estimate of the recent Soviet moves and gestures. To the extent that these moves and gestures are proved by events to be genuine efforts to reduce international tension, they will be welcomed by Member Governments, whose policy has always been to seek every opportunity for world peace.

8. Nevertheless, the Council found that there had not yet in fact been any change in the funda-

³ *Ibid.*, May 4, 1953, p. 639.

mental threat to the security of free peoples. The most striking evidence of this continuing threat is the huge and constantly strengthened military force maintained by those nations whose policies have been responsible for the present tension, and who are still promoting aggressive war in several parts of the world. The most recent example is the extension of hostilities in Laos. This serious development has increased the burden of France in the struggle against aggression and has given rise to deep concern on the part of other Member Governments.

9. The Council, therefore, reaffirmed the policy of collective defence which has proved fully justified, and which has been responsible for the growing confidence of the free world in the future. The Council felt that there was every prospect that this policy, continued with firmness and patience, will create a basis for a just settlement of unresolved international problems.

10. The Council considered it essential that Member Governments should continue to develop the free Atlantic Community which should include a European Defence Community to be established as soon as possible in an ever more closely united Europe.

11. The Council reaffirmed their fundamental desire to build for peace. They looked forward to the day when a greater share of the resources of their countries would be devoted to national and international reconstruction and development. Convinced that in unity lies their greatest strength, they are resolved to broaden co-operation in every field, economic, political and social, as well as military, and so to make the Atlantic Community a lasting reality.

TEXT OF RESOLUTION ON EDC ADOPTED APRIL 24

THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL,

RECALLING its previous resolutions of May 26th and December 17th, 1952, concerning the Treaty establishing the European Defence Community and the Additional Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty on guarantees to members of the European Defence Community;⁴

TAKING NOTE of the progress which has been made since the previous session, including submission of the Treaty to the parliaments of all signatory countries and the fact that five signatories have now completed parliamentary action on the Additional Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty on the guarantees given by the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty to members of the European Defence Community;

TAKING NOTE of the progress of the Interim Committee, created by the governments signatory to the Treaty establishing the European Defence

⁴ For text of the additional protocol, see *ibid.*, June 9, 1952, p. 896; for text of the NAC resolution of Dec. 17, 1952, see *ibid.*, Jan. 5, 1953, p. 4.

Community, in connection with the technical planning and other steps necessary to the Treaty's coming into force, including the completion of the Additional Protocols and agreements proposed by the Interim Committee and designed to facilitate the carrying out of certain important provisions of the Treaty;

Stresses that the Atlantic Community continues to attach paramount importance to the rapid entry into force of the Treaty establishing the European Defence Community, and, consequently, to its ratification by all signatories, as well as to the ratification of the Additional Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty.

Practicalities of Power

by Under Secretary Smith¹

The Chinese philosopher who lived and wrote about 3,000 years ago said once, "It is not only that at times certain men are dangerous to society, but that at times certain societies are dangerous to all honest and decent men." We still confront the most dangerous of those societies as we have in the past confronted a series of them. Those which are dangerous today are represented by Soviet Russia and Communist China.

Now this morning at about one o'clock I was awakened by the news yesterday that *Pravda* had published in full the text of President Eisenhower's recent speech on foreign relations. The fact that any other newspaper in the world published the full text of President Eisenhower's speech would arouse no comment at all. The fact that *Pravda*, in a totalitarian state, publishes such a speech approaches a major stature of a miracle, and you see in that one little vignette the difference between our free society and that which exists in the Soviet Union.²

I recall about 8 years ago the *Manchester Guardian*, I think it was, published a cartoon which impressed me enormously. The ordinarily four-by-four cartoon square was divided into 16 little one-inch squares and in the first of those squares the world, depicted as a cringing little dog, was getting a pat on the back from a benign, pipe-smoking Stalin and the little animal was wriggling all over with pleasure. In the next square the same little animal was getting a kick from Molotov, the stars were flying in all directions and, of course, it was

yowling with anguish. The third square was a repetition of the first, the fourth of the second, and so on over the whole 16 squares—alternate pats and kicks—alternate wriggles of pleasure and yowls of anguish, but a constant repetition of the same thing.

Under these circumstances I think it will help us remain oriented if we can keep constantly in mind the real fundamentals of present world conditions. One such real fundamental is power, and I mean by power, military power, regrettably. With a full understanding of the place of power in world relationships, we can better adjust ourselves to the requirements which have been imposed upon us and we can resolve satisfactorily in our own minds what might appear to be contradictions in American foreign policy.

For instance, there seems to be a contradiction when in all sincerity we advocate disarmament while we're spending billions of dollars to rearm ourselves and to rearm our allies. There seems to be a basic conflict in our unremitting efforts for peace while we go ahead with the development of more effective and destructive weapons. But actually, there isn't any contradiction at all. The necessity for this derives from the place of power in the world situation. We didn't inject this factor into it—it was and it has been there for many centuries. But the fact that we're not responsible for its presence does not permit us to ignore it. To do so would be the height of folly, and that is my theme today.

Since we cannot ignore the power factor, then obviously we have to deal with it, and if we're to deal with it successfully it must be understood both in its origin and in its evolution. The lessons of

¹ Address made at the University of New Hampshire, Durham, N. H., on Apr. 25 (press release 213).

² For a White House statement on this subject, see p. 678.

history are too well known on this campus for me to repeat them. It is sufficient for me to remind you that within the memory of a good many of you here, there were some governments that were inclined to look on an expeditionary force or on a cruiser as a convenient instrument for the conduct of international negotiations.

Today most members of the world community have abandoned some earlier, essentially primitive patterns of international behavior—and since World War II we and like-minded nations have joined in an effort to replace force as the decisive factor in the relationship between states with a more civilized mechanism. The cause of this evolution and our ideas regarding the application of military strength in world affairs are very simple. We realize that man's capacity to destroy himself and his works have increased almost beyond the scope of imagination. The thoughtful man of today lives with the sobering knowledge that weapons exist which could bring modern civilization to an explosive end. Consequently the United States and like-minded nations have broken with the historic and primitive pattern of power politics. We're trying to resolve international differences and tensions by economic, political, and diplomatic negotiation.

Possibly the tragedy enacted in Geneva in the 1920's was a necessary, if painful, lesson to the people of the world, but the failure of the League of Nations hasn't deterred us from making a new and much more promising effort. We now have an international organization to which disputes can be brought for discussion and arbitration, and there isn't one of you here that would dispute the fact that this procedure is the right and possibly the only road to a just and peaceful world order. We know very well the futility of seeking solutions through violence. We would discard force in favor of the peaceful methods of negotiation and compromise. Now if this fact were universally accepted, our worries and our present danger would be reduced to zero. Unfortunately it is not universally accepted. A very large segment of the peoples of the world are under the complete control of leaders who prefer to rely on military power as the definitive factor in their relationship with other nations.

Now in this tragically simple fact are the implications of immense consequences. Every time I think of it I think of an aphorism, attributed, I believe, to Chesterton, who said, "Christianity is mankind's greatest and finest thought—the only trouble is it has never really been tried." We have a situation, many of the aspects of which are those of peace, and yet we really have no peace. We want to be rid of the burden of armaments, yet we have to spend billions for arms and are likely to have to continue to spend billions for arms. We and our allies yearn for peace and we're fighting in Korea and we're fighting in Indochina and we're fighting in Malaya.

The Soviet Obsession

The root of the paradox lies in the Soviet obsession with the power factor, which I don't think any of you should ever forget. Because of this obsession we're compelled to create strength of our own as a counterweight to the strength of the Soviet Union. Even though we reject force as an instrument in our relationship with other nations, we've learned through bitter experience that Soviet intransigence reaches a peak when the negotiator across the table lacks power. If the Kremlin should as a temporary expedient make commitments, we can look forward to the likelihood that they may be violated before the ink is dry on the document if the commitments are made to an associate or another nation which lacks power. On the other hand, we've learned that it's possible to negotiate with the Soviet Union if our negotiating position has solid strength behind it.

Nothing that has happened in the past weeks can be construed as evidence of lessening the Soviet preoccupation with the power factor. Since 1919 there have been a great many twists and turns in Soviet policy, but as far as we know and as far as we can tell today, the fundamentals on which Russian policy is based have really not altered in any significant way. To understand this we should recognize that those fundamentals have existed for a long time and they were really not changed by the Bolshevik Revolution.

I have often quoted Lord Palmerston, a British statesman of the last century, a man who was extremely well-informed and a perceptive observer of Russia. Palmerston said:

It has always been the policy and the practice of the Russian government to expand its frontiers as rapidly as the apathy or the timidity of its neighbors would permit, but usually to halt and often to recoil when confronted by determined opposition, then to await the next favorable opportunity to spring upon its intended victim.

Now that analysis fits the postwar action of the Soviet Union very well indeed.

The Kremlin tried to keep troops in Northern Iran, then withdrew them in the face of determined opposition. The legitimate Greek Government after the war looked ripe for overthrow. The Kremlin instigated revolt and later abandoned the rebels when they were met with determined opposition. Berlin had all the earmarks of a soft touch. I was in Moscow at that time. I had very little hope for the situation. Soviet military forces blockaded the city and then when they encountered really determined opposition—and it wasn't military opposition either; it was moral and economic opposition backed up by an airlift—they lifted the blockade. Now each of these withdrawals was effected when determined opposition was met and not before.

Stalin spelled the thing out in a speech which I have read many times. It is included also in his famous work, *Problems of Leninism*. He was

describing the mishaps of the Czarists' government and he said:

The history of Russia of the olden days was that she was always getting defeated for her backwardness. Such is the law of the exploiters to beat those who are backward and weak. If you are backward, if you are weak, that means you are wrong. That means that you can be defeated and enslaved.

Now he was using that argument as a spur to the 5-year plan and for increasing enormously the heavy industry of Russia to support a military potential, but quite obviously those were his thoughts and he applied those ideas equally to other and to weaker nations than the Soviet Union.

We know very well that the Kremlin has never visualized a world of coequals. Lenin himself said:

We great Russians have never been able to make anything but slaves of captive peoples. We have visualized a dominant Russia among a galaxy of satellites and armed might is the first requisite for attaining such a globe-girdling objective.

In addition to the means of reducing the strength of the intended victim, military force and subversive tactics are also a necessity to weaken that strength before brute force is applied.

Now our own aspirations, as all of you know, are very different, but different though they are, we cannot disregard for a moment the Soviet reliance on force as a main means to get what it wants. Fortunately there have been several factors which have exerted a restraining influence on Russia's aggressive tendencies. One was the apparent belief that the mere existence of great strength can exert pressure enough so that the victim may give way without war, as in the case of Czechoslovakia. The second is related to the Soviet theory that capitalism bears the seeds of its own destruction. They think that time is on their side. I think that time is on ours.

Reasons for Conciliatory Moves

From their point of view, if they were convinced that a major move would be confronted by determined opposition, it's reasonable to assume they would switch to a more conciliatory line. On the other hand, of course, as you have seen, that doesn't mean that a small war which possibly doesn't involve the risk of global conflict may not, from the Soviet point of view, be entirely logical and extremely profitable. That's one of the reasons why we're fighting in Korea and one of the reasons why our allies are fighting in Indochina and Malaya.

In recent weeks we've witnessed what appears to be a reversal of the Soviet line. Naturally there has been great speculation as to the reasons for this change. I have given you one. Another is that the new Soviet directorate recognizes the necessity of time for consolidating its position. It may be that the Kremlin realizes that it is over-extended and requires a breathing spell. The

men in the Politburo are thoroughly aware of the facts of history and they know that several times in the past Russia has swallowed more than she could digest and has had to disgorge in a welter of bloodshed and confusion. And it cannot be said that the satellite states are yet digested.

But, as I have said, it seems more probable that the new regime is reacting to the effectiveness of Western methods in the face of danger; in other words, that there is a realization that they will be confronted by determined opposition and if a new policy is really developing we cannot of course afford to lose sight of the fact that it may be designed to split our developing coalition and weaken our capability for providing determined opposition.

We certainly won't reject the fact that the Kremlin may be willing to negotiate East-West differences in at least temporary good faith. As President Eisenhower said:

We're waiting for deeds—we care nothing for mere rhetoric. We care only for sincerity of peaceful purpose attested by acts.

I wonder if you are aware of the real importance of the President's speech in Washington on April 16?³ Not only at home here, but throughout the world? It brought about what is really a dramatic change in the political climate almost everywhere. Within hours of its delivery we began to receive cables from all parts of the world reflecting the approbation of chiefs of state and diplomatic chanceries. In Western Europe it was greeted as marking the beginning of a new initiative—in the Near and Middle East it has been warmly welcomed—in the Far East and particularly in Japan it has been widely praised.

We don't know exactly how it has affected the people who live behind the Iron Curtain. We do know that it was taken very seriously in many places. In the satellite countries where it was heard over the Voice of America, it was received with great emotion—in some cases, by tears.

As a whole, then, at this moment, the peoples of the world seem to me to be more united in a desire for the settlement of differences and difficulties than they have been for a long time indeed. But this climate will not endure indefinitely. So we watch and wait for signs that the Soviet Union will respond in good faith, and while waiting for deeds not words, we must indeed follow a policy which might be described as the "open hand and the closed fist." The open hand of course is always extended as a sincere gesture for peace—the fist must be clenched in readiness because we're dealing with a regime which we know is still wedded in an archaic concept of power. The choice rests with the leaders of the Soviet Union. It's up to them to choose which hand.

Now during this 3-day convocation of yours, you have heard a great many wise words and much

³ BULLETIN of Apr. 27, 1953, p. 599.

about the full and thoughtful life on a college campus where the ideas and policies of the growing generation which will control this country during the years to come are being molded. Perhaps what I have just said may be a rather drab climax, but you people of New Hampshire have a reputation for facing facts and I have given some of them quite simply to you as I see them.

One of these facts is that the world has so shrunk in terms of life and space that we are in a way living under conditions such as the countries of Central Europe lived under for a great many centuries. That is, the oceans which protected our eastern and western coasts are no longer formidable or impassable obstacles. In terms of time and space they can be passed now in a matter of hours and thus they are like the geographic frontiers of the countries of Central Europe—a river, or a mountain range—which might be crossed in a day or in a matter of hours. Those nations for centuries faced across those frontiers a potential enemy, as today we face a potential enemy across ours, and we may live under that state of tension for a long time to come.

If you on this campus live up to the traditions of your school and of your State and of your ancestors, there is no reason why, if we have to do it, we should not face such a condition with calm confidence in our country and in its future and I have complete confidence that you will.

U.S. To Assist Victims of Viet Minh Aggression

Statement by Secretary Dulles

Press release 238 dated May 2

Ever since the invasion of Laos began, we have been following developments there with the closest attention and grave concern. Here is another case of ruthless and unprovoked attack upon a country peacefully ruled by a duly constituted government recognized by 35 other nations. When the Communist talk of a Laotian "liberation army" and of "Vietnamese volunteers," they are using the classic Communist phrases which were invented to cloak aggression and which now identify aggression.

We have encouraging reports that the people of Laos are rallying around their King and are co-

operating with the forces of the French Union in the defense of their capital. Their efforts are an integral part of the struggle of the entire free world against enslavement and are recognized as such here.

We are maintaining close contact with the Governments of Laos and of France regarding the special requirements of the situation. We have already taken steps to expedite the delivery of critically needed military items to the forces defending Laos.

We are especially concerned at the plight of the Laotian people who have been driven from their homes by the invaders. The MSA Mission in Laos is arranging to be of help to the Laotian Government in the furnishing of the funds and supplies needed to care for these victims of Viet Minh aggression.

Soviet Reaction to President's Speech

On April 25 Pravda devoted its front page to a reprint of the President's April 16 address on world peace (BULLETIN of April 27, 1953, p. 599) and to an editorial stating that the Soviet Union was ready to enter into "businesslike" discussions with the West to end outstanding controversies. James Hagerty, the President's press secretary, on April 25 made the following statement on the Soviet reaction to the President's speech:

White House press release dated April 25

I have talked with the President about the *Pravda* editorial. Its milder tone is a welcome change from the usual vituperation against the United States and the free world. It is also significant that the worldwide interest in the President's peace speech caused the Soviet leaders to reprint it in full for the Russian people.

Of course, the *Pravda* editorial cannot be considered a substitute for an official action by the Soviet leaders.

Maybe this editorial is a first step toward something concrete. If so, the free world will continue to wait for the definite steps that must be made if the Soviet leaders are sincerely interested in a cooperative solution to world problems.

If the Soviet leaders take such steps they will find the United States and the other free nations, as always, ready to work unceasingly for peace.

The Foreign Service as an Arm of U. S. Policy

by *Clare Boothe Luce*
*Ambassador to Italy*¹

The Foreign Service is the overseas arm of our President and Secretary of State. Our Government, in the carrying out of its foreign policy, can be no stronger than the strength of that arm.

As you know, to do the tremendous job of keeping Americans and American interests safe at home and abroad, there are now about 10,000 Americans in the Foreign Service—from ambassadors and ministers to clerks and stenographers.

At the present time there are slightly less than 1,500 Foreign Service officers, all commissioned by the President, like Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps officers. Like their Service colleagues, these Foreign Service officers look to a career dedicated in the same way to the service of their country.

Too often, when people think of the work of the American Foreign Service, they think of assignments to big, glamorous Embassies such as Paris, Rome, London, or Rio. They forget that our country has about 300 diplomatic and consular posts in 75 countries throughout the world. Most of these posts are small and many extremely unpleasant. Tihwa, for example, which was closed when the Communists seized Northern China, was 1,500 miles from the nearest contact with civilization. There was only one bathtub in the entire city.

Or take Jidda, in Arabia, where the year-round temperature is as hot or hotter than our hottest day here in New York, where there are frequent sandstorms, where there are no organized public facilities for sports or other entertainment, where all drinking water must be boiled, and where such things as telephone service and public transportation services are virtually nonexistent. Or again, take Accra on the West Coast of Africa, where nearly all food must be imported, where sewage is carried beside the streets in open ditches, where the average humidity at dawn is 93 percent, and

where it is often necessary to wear mosquito boots whenever one leaves the house for a visit to friends.

Finally, let's look at one of our consulates at a remote outpost in South America. In this town the temperature is from 80 to 90 degrees all year round. No water, milk, or fresh vegetables may be consumed without boiling. There are no suitable hospital or first aid facilities, and it is often impossible to find a doctor of any kind. Two-thirds of the population have no sewers or running water, and nearly 90 percent of the population are infected by some form of internal parasite. Malaria, syphilis, yaws, pinta, and tetanus are prevalent. These are only a few examples of the many posts where thousands of men and women of the Foreign Service surrender the privileges and comforts of American life in order to help maintain that way of life for the rest of us.

Not the least of the hardships suffered by American Foreign Service personnel is that of being compelled to become, to a great extent, strangers to their own country. It is not pleasant to serve one's country by accepting exile from it. But the love of America remains. It should be remembered that the song "Home, Sweet Home" was not written by a man sitting safely at his fireside, but by an American Foreign Service officer stationed in Tunis.

Undercover Work in World War II

There are many dramatic pages in the history of the Foreign Service. Consider the part played by about a dozen officers in helping to pave the way for the American landings in North Africa in 1942. These Foreign Service officers not only provided a vast amount of military information about fortifications and other defense arrangements in North Africa but also worked quietly to organize anti-Nazi resistance groups among the French. Discovery of some of their activities would have meant imprisonment or death, and they were in peril day and night. However, their undercover operations were performed so effectively that German agents were almost completely

¹ Excerpts from an address made before the American Italy Society at New York on Apr. 8.

fooled. Captured Nazi files later revealed that some of the most effective American Foreign Service officers had been lightly dismissed by the Nazis as "draftdodgers" and "playboys."

It would be impossible to review all the exciting and dangerous adventures which befell these Foreign Service officers, but a few may be illustrative. There was one night when one officer smuggled into a hotel, in full sight of Nazi officers, a radio beacon wrapped in a gunny sack for use in guiding American transports carrying parachutists. There was the evening, shortly before the North African landings, when two American Foreign Service officers pretended to conduct a drunken card game with a French friend while Gen. Mark Clark, who had landed secretly from an Allied submarine, hid in the cellar and while the house was being raided by Vichy French police. Then, there was the officer who was seized and held incommunicado for 5 days after the Allied landings but who escaped and made his way through German lines to Algiers, where he was able to furnish Allied Military Headquarters much valuable information.

The Foreign Service officers in North Africa had advance information as to the time of the invasion but could not leave their offices and hotels without attracting attention. Therefore, they deliberately exposed themselves to bombing, artillery fire, and machinegun fire in order to avoid any tipoff to the enemy.

It is difficult to estimate the number of American lives saved by the work done by these Foreign Service officers in "softening" North Africa for the invasion. For example, resistance groups with whom these officers worked virtually paralyzed Algiers during the first 6 hours of the Allied landings. Another prize example was the commander of a defending French regiment who issued only three rounds of ammunition to his men and ordered them to surrender when the ammunition was exhausted. All told, French resistance to the Allied invasion was greatly reduced by the courage and ingenuity shown by these Foreign Service officers during the long months of preparation.

The skills and capabilities of American Foreign Service officers are nowhere more widely recognized than among our senior military commanders. Top commanders such as General Eisenhower, General Ridgway, General Clark, Admiral McCormick, Admiral Carney, etc., have repeatedly sought the services of experienced American diplomats for their personal staffs. Recognizing the need for such services, the Department of State has assigned some of its best Foreign Service officers to these jobs. Their advice and assistance has proved itself of value on many occasions and has helped to assure the closest coordination of our diplomatic policy with our military strategy.

During these last minutes in Washington I've had the very illuminating and thrilling experience

of encountering, for the first time, a number of the members of this Foreign Service on duty in Washington. . . . I have been greatly impressed by the experienced, intelligent, and dedicated civil servants with whom I have been brought into touch as a result of my new job.

I am convinced that our Foreign Service should be staffed with Americans who, in terms of character and intelligence, are typical of the best of the various sections of the United States and who are highly qualified specialists, professionally trained in all aspects of relations between nations. I am convinced that this is the kind of staff we have if the Foreign Service people I have met in the Department are typical examples of the Foreign Service.

I think, my friends, it is high time the American people began to realize that they have been, may I say frankly, very unappreciative, very grudging in their recognition and applause of this tremendous corps of loyal and dedicated men.

Why? Well, somehow the false idea has got about that our Foreign Service men are political jobholders; that they, let me put it bluntly, ought to be politicians, and as politicians, they ought to be fired for following the orders and directives given to them by previous presidents and secretaries.

Now it is true that when an administration's foreign and domestic policies no longer reflect the will of the people, the people change their administration in their national election. But let us also remember, by and large what we intend to change is the policy and the policymakers. The great body of our administration civil servants remain. If they did not government itself would collapse, because the new administration would not have the political troops with which to govern.

Again, in the army, in war or in peace, when a general is replaced we do not demand the demobilization of his troops. Even in the event he were court-martialed for losing a battle, we certainly would not expect the general who took his place to shoot all his junior officers. Nevertheless, many people talk today as though a change of the Secretary and Under Secretaries—and the policymakers—should be followed by a wholesale change of our Foreign Service officers.

Well, let us imagine that all our Foreign Service officers overseas were ordered to pack their bags and come home within a few weeks after the election of a new President, simply because they had done what their oath of office requires of them—obeyed the directives and orders of the previous Secretary and his President. Can you possibly imagine the effect such a procedure would have on America's interests abroad and on our diplomatic relations? It would be catastrophic.

I hope I am not being too subtle, my friends. I am just trying to say that because there have been in the State Department and the Foreign Service a fraction of men who have been unworthy of our trust is no reason for us to withhold from

the loyal and dedicated many in our Foreign Service the great confidence and the praise the vast majority of them so richly deserve.

And now in closing, I address myself to the real ambassadors, who are you the people. Sound diplomacy, it has been said, is simply Christian charity and prudence operating in international affairs.

But we live in a world—at least on our side of the Iron Curtain—where neither presidents, nor secretaries, nor cabinet members, nor generals, nor ambassadors can accomplish much without the vigorous support of the people and informed public opinion. . . .

Role of Private Organizations in Technical Assistance Programs

Press release 204 dated April 20

Secretary Dulles, at his press conference on April 20, made the following reply to questions concerning whether his testimony before the House Appropriations Subcommittee on March 18¹ indicated that private organizations would be expected to conduct programs of assistance to underdeveloped countries should the goal of President Eisenhower, to bring about a general reduction in armaments, be accomplished.²

No, I would not think so. In the first place, there has grown up a slight misapprehension as to what I said about private organizations handling the Point Four Program. I did say that the type of activity which is represented by the Point Four Program is one which has in the past been to a very considerable extent carried on by private corporations, foundations, and the like. I felt that it would be healthy if they felt a greater responsibility in those respects and did not feel that the U.S. Government was pre-empting the field and that, therefore, they did not need to exert themselves to carry on activities relating to the development abroad of greater technical information.

I believe that in all of these matters it is healthier that the activities, if feasible, should be conducted by private organizations rather than by government. Of course, under present conditions it cannot be totally conducted by private operations, and if there was an operation of the magnitude which is contemplated by the President in his address, that would obviously go far beyond the capability of any private organizations.

¹ "Hearings Before the Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives, 83d Cong., 1st sess., Department of State," p. 5.

² President Eisenhower outlined his views on disarmament in his address before the American Society of Newspaper Editors on Apr. 16. For text of the address, see BULLETIN of Apr. 27, 1953, p. 599.

Export-Import Bank Credits to Spain, Japan

The Export-Import Bank announced on April 13 that it has authorized the establishment of a short-term credit of \$12 million to assist in financing Spain's imports of U.S. raw cotton and spinnable waste. The credit is to be extended to the following Spanish commercial banks with the guarantee of the Bank of Spain:

Banco Hispano Americano
Banco Exterior de Espana
Banco Espanol de Credito
Banco de Vizcaya
Banco Central
Banco de Bilbao

Cotton purchased under contracts entered into subsequent to April 9, 1953, and shipped subsequent to the date of the contract will be eligible for financing under the line of credit. At current market prices approximately 55,000 bales of cotton can be financed by the credit. Financing will be done through letters of credit under which 18-month drafts bearing an interest rate of 3½ percent per annum will be drawn on the Bank of Spain as agent for the Spanish commercial banks. The credit will be available through September 30, 1953.

Final details with respect to the operation of the credit are yet to be negotiated and a further announcement will be made when arrangements have been completed.

The Export-Import Bank on April 14 announced that it has authorized a short-term credit of \$40 million to assist in financing Japan's imports of U.S. raw cotton from the 1952 crop. The credit will be in favor of the Bank of Japan and it will operate through U.S. and Japanese commercial banks and cotton marketing channels which customarily finance and handle cotton trade between the United States and Japan. At current market prices, approximately 200,000 bales of cotton can be financed by this credit.

The credit will bear interest at 3½ percent per annum and will be repayable within 15 months.

Final details with respect to the operation of the credit are yet to be negotiated and a further announcement will be made when arrangements have been completed. At that time, all inquiries relating to details of its operation should be addressed by the American cotton shipper to his bank or banks in the United States, or to his agents or customers in Japan.

The Bank pointed out that facilitation of the cotton trade, which is the purpose of the credit, is one of the most important factors in U.S.-Japanese economic relations. In recent years Japan has been the largest export market for U.S. cotton, and hence is of great significance

to our cotton economy, the prosperity of which is highly dependent on exports. On the other hand, the Japanese cotton-textile industry is of central and basic importance to the economy of that country. Japan is dependent upon foreign trade for maintenance of its economy and living standards. The Japanese textile industry contributes about half the value of all Japanese exports but it must import all its requirements of raw cotton.

Guaranty Issued for Private Investment in Haiti

Harold E. Stassen, Director for Mutual Security, on April 15 announced the signing of the first U.S. Government investment-guaranty agreement with an American Republic.

The agreement with the Republic of Haiti makes possible Mutual Security Agency (Msa) guaranties protecting new American investors in that country against currency inconvertibility and loss by expropriation. The agreement was concluded in an exchange of notes between John M. Cabot, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, and Jacques Leger, Haitian Ambassador to the United States.

"Private investment in a friendly country can be a major economic benefit to that country and an important step in President Eisenhower's program of gaining peace and progress with prosperity for the free world," Mr. Stassen said. "I am delighted that the Msa investment-guaranty program can now encourage United States firms and individuals to invest capital in another country of the Western Hemisphere."

Msa has authority to extend guaranties to U.S. investors in any of the 57 mutual-security-program countries after the conclusion of guaranty agreements between the U.S. Government and the country involved. The program originally was limited to Western European countries participating in the Marshall plan and their dependent territories.

Pointing out that Haiti is the 16th nation to enter into such an agreement, Stassen said that he hoped the other American Republics would follow the lead of the Caribbean country. Invitations to discuss the program have been extended to other countries in the Western Hemisphere, Mr. Stassen said.

"The investment of United States capital can help to promote industrial diversification, provide new employment, and stimulate other industries which may produce raw materials or other products used by the newly created enterprise," Mr.

Stassen said. "These investments often provide more consumer goods at lower cost, effect a saving in foreign exchange and make possible new earnings for the country through increasing its export potential," he added.

A currency convertibility guaranty would provide that, if the investor should be unable to convert local currency receipts from the investment into dollars through regular banking channels, the U. S. Government would provide the dollar exchange.

A guaranty against loss by expropriation would provide for reimbursement of the investor by the U.S. Government for loss of investment property due to expropriatory action.

Haiti has taken other steps during the past few years to encourage new industries. For instance, legislation has been passed exempting from import duties machinery, equipment, and raw materials necessary for new industries. A similar exemption has been extended recently to raw materials necessary for the production of handicrafts to be exported.

Another important step encouraging new investment in Haiti was a reduction of the national income tax by 50 percent during the first year of an enterprise and 20 percent during the next four.

A recent partial listing by the Government of Haiti showed 23 industries for which raw materials are available in Haiti, including leather and shoes, glass, salt, tropical-fruit processing, dairy products, paper, fish, cotton textiles, rubber products, metals, transport, soap, chemicals, limestone, grain, chocolate, fiber products, vegetable oils, talc, lumber, and beverages.

The agreement between the United States and Haiti defines the treatment to be accorded by the Government of Haiti to currency or claims which the U.S. Government might acquire if any Msa guaranties should be invoked by an investor in Haiti.

If a convertibility guaranty should be invoked and the U.S. Government thus acquired local currency, Haiti would recognize the transfer of ownership of the currency, under the intergovernment agreement. Such currency would then be available for administrative expenses of U.S. Government representatives in Haiti.

Under other terms of the agreement, any claims to ownership of property acquired by the U.S. Government by paying off an investor's expropriation loss would also be recognized. Such claims would be negotiated on the diplomatic level rather than through the local courts. If no settlement were reached through diplomatic channels, the next step under the agreement would be arbitration of the claims by a person selected by mutual agreement, or by an arbitrator selected by the president of the International Court of Justice.

The World Economic Situation

Statement by James J. Wadsworth

U.S. Representative in the U.N. Economic and Social Council¹

U.S./U.N. press release dated April 16

To begin with I want to express my pleasure at being able to join in this discussion of the world economic situation. Many of you have participated before. For me, this is the first time.

I need not emphasize the importance of this annual debate. This Council is the only world-wide forum on economic matters where the views of the world, on the problems of the world, can be thoroughly aired.

The studies of world economic conditions submitted to us each year in connection with this debate are among the less spectacular but most constructive achievements of the United Nations. The three regional reports of the Economic Commission for Latin America, the Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East, and the Economic Commission for Europe,² combined with the annual World Economic Report and its supplements on Africa and the Middle East, provide unique sources of information on economic developments in various parts of the world.

The most comprehensive of these studies is, of course, the World Economic Report.³ It is also the most difficult to prepare. The more it aims at universality of coverage, the more it runs into the great differences in the availability of data from country to country. In the absence of adequate official data for such countries as Communist China, there is great temptation to use unverified data obtained from questionable sources.

I am not suggesting that the authors of the World Economic Report should simply omit any reference to countries whose governments consistently refuse to let their own people, or the world, know about the true economic conditions in their territories. I do suggest, however, that the report

should make it clear, much clearer than is the case at present, that they are obliged to operate with altogether inadequate data and that any conclusions drawn from them can at best be only tentative.

Notwithstanding these shortcomings, I consider the report, taken as a whole, a well-written, illuminating survey. It offers an excellent basis for a discussion of world economic conditions.

Economic Effects of Armament Programs

It is now nearly 3 years since the outbreak of hostilities in Korea imposed upon us the cruel necessity of a sharp acceleration of our defense efforts. During that period defense programs have been a major force in shaping trends in the free world's economies. I propose later to consider these trends in relation to my own country. For the moment, however, I should like to confine myself, drawing largely on the World Economic Report, to a brief review of the main course of the economy of the free world under the impact of rearmament needs. The report gives virtually no consideration to the impact of armament production in the Soviet Union and the so-called people's democracies. Accordingly, it does not permit of a similar review of the effect of their armament programs on their economies. It is a well known fact, however, that the levels of production cited in the report for these countries include continuous and heavy armament expenditures maintained at the expense of the standards of living of their people.

For nearly a year and a half the armament effort which came with the Korean war engendered an economic upswing. The demand for many basic materials soared. Fears of impending shortages in consumer goods led to scare-buying. Prices, particularly of primary products, rose sharply. Inflationary pressures were intensified. Governments endeavored, with varying degrees of success, to restrain these pressures. Taxes were

¹ Made in the Economic and Social Council on Apr. 16.

² For a review of the ECE report, see BULLETIN of Apr. 13, 1953, p. 534.

³ Preliminary World Economic Report for 1951-52, U.N. doc. E/2353.

increased and credit tightened. In some instances more direct measures were taken, such as price controls, allocations, and limitations upon raw material end uses. Meanwhile, there was a sharp upsurge in production, accompanied by a rapid accumulation of inventories.

By the closing months of 1951 the economic pattern was different. Inflation was under control. Anticipatory and speculative buying virtually ended. As the abnormal commodity demands declined, the prices of primary commodities receded. Inventory accumulations slowed down. Industrial production for a time ceased to expand but during the last third of 1952 again turned upward.

The result, as the World Economic Report indicates, was that 1952 was a year of relative economic stability, with a satisfactory normal growth in world industrial production. The increase in 1952 over the 1951 level was about 2 percent, in contrast to the abnormal rise in 1951 of close to 14 percent. The fact that such a great increase was followed by a year which was on the whole one of relative stability and further growth in world production is ground for satisfaction.

The defense effort has imposed heavy burdens on the free world. It has entailed great increases in public expenditure with considerable additions to the tax load. It has absorbed, and continues to absorb, a large volume of resources. Generally speaking, however, the free world has shouldered these burdens with less difficulty than was anticipated. Extraordinary resilience and powers of expansion have been demonstrated in the economies of those countries carrying the major burden of the rearmament effort. As a result of these qualities the arms needed for defense have been forthcoming. At the same time, the supply of goods available for civilian consumption has been increased, and large amounts of equipment essential for economic development have been made available for export.

Since 1937, industrial production has risen by 75 percent. By contrast, the growth of food output by only 10 percent is disturbing. When viewed against the 15 percent increase in world population it means that we are still losing ground in the fight against hunger.

The lag in food production is one of the crucial economic and social problems of our time. Vast numbers of people are still inadequately fed. An expansion of world food supplies is a vital necessity. It must be a basic element in all plans for raising standards of living in the underdeveloped parts of the world.

Economic Developments in the U.S.

I should like to turn now to developments in my own country since the beginning of the Korean trouble.

Economic events in the United States have paralleled to a high degree those described for the

world as a whole by the Secretary-General. There was in this country, too, a post-Korean wave-like motion of inventories and prices, with an upward trend of both industrial and agricultural output.

The output of our farms, factories, mines, and service industries continued to increase in 1952, although not at the high over-all rates as in 1951. Moreover, the past 6 months have shown a greater rate of growth than the first 9 months of 1952, the period covered by the Secretary-General's report. For 1952 as a whole, the gross national product was close to \$350 billion. In the fourth quarter of that year it exceeded an annual rate of \$360 billion. In real terms, 1952 gross output was almost 2½ percent above 1951 and almost 25 percent above 1946.

This expansion in output was accompanied by an expansion in employment. Unemployment fell in 1952 to only 2.7 percent of the total civilian labor force.

Agricultural production in 1952 was the largest in my country's history. It permitted us to export to the rest of the world 564 million bushels of wheat and immense quantities of other foodstuffs vital to the survival of millions of people abroad.

Since farming is something I happen to know a little about from personal experience, I should like to take this occasion to say a word about the American farmer. The extensive program of our Federal and State Governments to develop efficient land-use techniques, to extend the use of fertilizers and other soil chemicals, to improve the quality of seeds and livestock, to control pests and plant diseases, and in general to make scientific practices known to farmers has, of course, been a most important factor in increasing our farm output. But it takes more than education and know-how to keep the farm economy expanding. I am confident that we could not have achieved these production records had not our farmers had the initiative and the ingenuity to make full use of these scientific developments and improved technology.

The year 1952 was a period of balanced growth in contrast to the more uneven expansion of the previous year. An upturn occurred in a wide variety of soft goods industries which had experienced a decline in 1951—apparel, leather, and especially textiles. This expansion has continued into 1953. Production of consumer durables—from automobiles to television sets—followed a similar course. Total retail sales in January and February of 1953 were 9 percent above the corresponding months of 1952. In the civilian economy this general expansion extended also into consumer services, capital goods, industrial capacity, public works, and the construction of houses.

As output increased, the inflationary pressures of the previous 2 years abated in the United States as they did elsewhere. Prices in primary markets declined, while prices at retail leveled off. Wages

have been rising and, by and large, real incomes of the American worker have increased.

Emergency Controls Eliminated

The abundance of goods made possible the elimination, in the past 6 months, of most of the emergency economic controls previously imposed. It is testimony to the great underlying potential for expanding production that the need for controls created by the Korean war was so short-lived. Three years after Korea, our economy is once more free from controls and is producing more civilian and defense goods combined than ever before.

While domestic activity in the United States increased during 1952, our exports of merchandise, exclusive of military-aid shipments, showed a decline. Nevertheless we continued to increase our shipments of capital goods to all parts of the world. Our exports of electrical and industrial machinery amounted to \$2.2 billion, an increase of 15 percent over the previous year. All of the underdeveloped areas of the free world shared in this increase. Our machinery shipments to the Far East were 33 percent higher than in 1951.

At the same time, the value, though not the volume, of merchandise imports fell slightly from the alltime peak of 1951. Taking into account all current items—remittances, tourist expenditures, shipping and other services, as well as merchandise—the export surplus fell from \$3.2 billion in 1951 to \$1.8 billion in 1952. This represented, of course, a reduction of the dollar deficit of the rest of the world and to that extent an advance toward a better balance-of-payments position. The reduced deficit was more than made up by the outflow of private capital and United States grants and loans. As a result, the rest of the world increased its gold and dollar holdings during 1952 by \$1.2 billion.

Let me turn now to a point which may be bothering many of you—the fact that world industrial production in 1952 did not continue to increase as fast as in 1951. Some may interpret this as a cause for concern. An analysis will show I think, that concern is not warranted.

From 1946 to 1948 there was an increase of 25 percent in world production. This phenomenal increase was largely a result of the reactivation of idle capital and labor as part of the process of recovery from war. In the face of destruction, dislocation, and rampant inflation which the war brought, the recovery was extraordinary. Demobilized soldiers, refugees, damaged factories, dislocated businesses, long-unused avenues of trade—all these were reassembled and put back to work with a speed which was nothing less than spectacular. Then, in 1950-51, many countries were forced to turn their efforts to the production

of war materials. Total world output again spurted upward.

Once this process was well along, however, it was hardly reasonable to look for a continued increase in production of such dramatic proportions. A rate of between 2 and 5 percent a year for the world as a whole, looked at in historical perspective, is in fact a rate which the world can view with satisfaction in normal times.

As far as the U.S. economy is concerned, every indication leads me to believe that investment will continue to expand in 1953, giving strength to the U.S. economy and more than counterbalancing any letup in defense expenditures. In each of the past 2 years plant and equipment expenditures by business firms have approximated \$26 billion, much of which was devoted to civilian production. The total plant and equipment now planned for the year 1953 as a whole should result in equally high investment.

Beyond these private investments lies an area of potential public construction whose dimensions at this point are not fully known. We need many more schools, and state and local governments are actively planning for them. We appear to be on the verge of a new era in highway construction brought on by an extraordinary growth in automobile ownership since the end of World War II. If there is concern lest these expansive forces be dissipated, I would agree with Secretary of Commerce Sinclair Weeks who recently called attention to the fact that:

The American system today has many floors underneath to check an old-fashioned slump—high savings, social security, pensions, emergency laws and other props . . . The new administration would not hesitate to use such strong measures as might be required in an emergency.

Factors in Economic Progress

Developments in relation to production, employment, trade, and prices, with which I have so far been mainly concerned, are the concrete measures of economic progress. I should like now to turn from facts and figures to consider briefly some of the factors on which that progress mainly depends.

The possession of abundant natural resources is obviously a major advantage to any area. I need not dwell on such matters as this. What I wish to emphasize is the great importance also of an economic and political environment which encourages its people to put forward their best efforts to improve their economic situation.

The economic development of the United States has been achieved under what we call the system of free enterprise. This is a system which we believe encourages individual initiative, leaves men free to try out new ways of doing things, and promotes the most efficient and productive combination of labor and management. The maintenance of this system has, I am convinced, been

a dynamic force in promoting our economic welfare.

I recognize that this free enterprise system is pursued also in varying degrees by many other nations. I do not say that it would necessarily fit all countries as well as it does the United States. But one thing I do assert with some confidence. That is, that healthy incentives to individual effort are of vital importance for economic progress.

Accordingly one of the most important things a government can do to promote economic well-being is to develop and maintain policies which contribute to this individual dynamic incentive.

First and foremost among such policies is the maintenance of internal financial stability. All of you know the effects of uncontrolled inflation. It hampers the domestic production of goods required for economic development. The easy increase in money incomes weakens incentives to sustained work; the rise in prices discourages savings; new investment tends to take the form of speculative ventures rather than real capital formation. The balance-of-payments position deteriorates, making it more difficult to import capital goods needed to improve productivity. Sound tax policies, credit policies, trade policies, are among the checkreins on those evils.

Land reform is another area of government policy where much can be done to establish conditions favorable to production. Give the farmer a real stake in his work and his future and he will exercise his best ingenuity to improve his land and to increase his output. But the job of instituting such policies is primarily the responsibility of the underdeveloped countries themselves, as is stated so well in the World Economic Report.

Economic growth can also be stimulated through government policies aimed at encouraging private investment, both domestic and foreign. Domestically, this means stimulating savings, mobilizing capital, and inducing it to enter lines of production which will contribute most to development. Since domestic sources of capital are typically insufficient in underdeveloped countries to support an adequate level of investment, vigorous efforts must also be made to establish an environment congenial to the international flow of private capital. In the last analysis, only the local governments can establish a climate in which the foreign investor feels welcome and is convinced that he will get an even break.

The most fundamental problem still facing the world is the creation of conditions which will permit a steady, worldwide improvement in standards of living. Basic to such improvement is increased production. President Eisenhower expressed the issue this way in his message to Congress last week:⁴

The building of a productive and strong economic system within the free world, one in which each country may

better sustain itself through its own efforts, will require action by other governments, as well as by the United States, over a wide range of economic activities. These must include adoption of sound internal policies, creation of conditions fostering international investment, assistance to underdeveloped areas, progress toward freedom of international payments and convertibility of currencies, and trade arrangements aimed at the widest possible multilateral trade.

This means that the approach of the U.S. Government to these problems will be the cooperative approach—working hand in hand with those countries who wish to join in the common endeavor. The President has expressed our determination that these efforts must succeed. In the same message from which I just read, he stated our deep realization that the contribution of the United States to the solution of the free world's economic problems "is so large as to be crucially important to its success," and that its success "is crucially important to the United States."

Documents on Korean Armistice Negotiations

Summary of Liaison Meeting of April 19

1. Meeting of Senior Liaison Groups convened at 1100 hours. Substance of record follows:

2. UNO: "I have a statement to make. The position of the United Nations Command with respect to resuming plenary sessions of the Korean Armistice negotiations was stated to you in General Harrison's letter to General Nam Il, dated 16 April, 1953.¹ I reiterate the position of the United Nations Command, that it will resume plenary sessions in the expectation that the detailed arrangements for the implementation of the new proposal of your side will be along the reasonable and practical lines set forth in General Harrison's letter. Based on the foregoing, I am authorized to announce to you that the United Nations Command Delegation will be prepared to meet with your delegation at 1100 on 23 April, 1953, for the purpose of seeking an overall settlement of the question of prisoners of war along constructive and reasonable lines."

3. Communists: a. "I am instructed by the Senior Delegate of our side to make the following statement before the Liaison Group meeting enters into discussion on the date for the resumption of plenary sessions. We have studied the letter of April 16 from the Senior Delegate of your side and consider it necessary to point out that, as the Senior Delegate of our side has stated in his letter of April 9² to the Senior Delegate of your side, the new proposal of our side for settling the entire question of prisoners of war is a highly constructive proposal. In order to eliminate the differences between the two sides on the question of repatriation of prisoners of war and to bring about an armistice in Korea for which the whole world has been longing, our side has made an obvious concession as to the steps, time, and procedure of the repatriation of prisoners of war. Our side proposes that the repatriation of prisoners of war be carried out in two steps; that is, both parties to the negotiations should undertake to repatriate immediately after the cessation of hostilities all those prisoners of war in their custody who insist upon repatriation, and to hand over the remaining prisoners of war to a neutral State so as to insure a just solution to the question of their repatriation.

b. "The high constructiveness of this proposal has al-

⁴ BULLETIN of Apr. 27, 1953, p. 634.

¹ BULLETIN of Apr. 27, 1953, p. 608.

² *Ibid.*, Apr. 20, 1953, p. 515.

ready been recognized by the whole world. As to the concrete measures for implementing this proposal, it is very obvious that the meeting of negotiations between the delegates of both sides.

c. "The agreements of both sides on various other major problems with regard to an armistice in Korea were all reached in this way. As a matter of fact in negotiations with both sides on an equal footing, only consultation and discussion at the conference are the proper way of settling questions. The Korean People's Army and the Chinese People's Volunteers consider that the concrete suggestions of either side should all be put forth at the meetings of negotiations between the delegates of both sides.

d. "The progress of the negotiations depends on the effort of both sides. The task which lies before both sides before the resumption of the meetings of negotiations should not be to visualize a recess after the resumption of the plenary sessions, but rather should be to speedily discuss and decide upon the date of reopening the plenary sessions in order to resume the negotiations and realize an armistice in Korea by common efforts.

e. "With regard to the time and date for the resumption of the plenary sessions of the delegations to the armistice negotiations, our delegation is prepared to hold a meeting with your delegation at 1100 hours on 25 April."

4. UNC: "We agree that our delegation will meet with your delegation on 25 April, 1953 at 1100 hours."

5. Communists: a. "Now both sides have come to a common view regarding the date for resuming the plenary sessions of the delegations of both sides.

b. "I propose that the meetings of the Liaison Groups of both sides recess till either side considers it is necessary to hold a meeting to discuss the question of repatriating sick and injured prisoners of war."

6. UNC: "We agree with your proposal to adjourn the Liaison Groups meeting until either side requests a meeting."

7. Meeting adjourned at 1120 hours.

Summaries of Plenary Talks¹

APRIL 26 SESSION

The first plenary session of the re-opening of the Armistice negotiations at Panmunjom convened today at 2 p. m. This was the first plenary meeting since the recess called by Lt. Gen. William K. Harrison, Jr., Chief UNC delegate, on October 8, 1952. General Harrison headed the UNC delegation and the Communist delegation was headed by General Nam Il.

General Nam Il presented a six-point proposal as the basis on which the Communists felt the Armistice negotiations should be conducted.

[Following is the text of the Communist proposal:

"First, within 2 months after the armistice agreement becomes effective, both sides shall, without offering any hindrance, repatriate and hand over in groups all these prisoners of war who insist upon repatriation to the side to which the prisoner of war belongs in accordance with the related provisions of paragraph 51, article 111, of the armistice agreement and in conformity with the final name lists exchanged and checked by both sides.

"Second, within the time limit of 1 month after the completion of the direct repatriation of all those prisoners of war who insist upon repatriation, the detaining side shall be responsible for sending to a neutral state, agreed upon through consultation of both sides, the remaining prisoners of war who are not directly repatriated and then release them from its military control. Such prisoners of war shall be received and taken into custody by the authorities of the neutral state concerned in an area desig-

nated by such authorities. The authorities of the neutral state concerned shall have the authority to exercise their legitimate functions and responsibilities for the control of the prisoners of war under their temporary jurisdiction.

"Third, within 6 months after the date of arrival of such prisoners of war in the neutral state, the nations to which they belong shall have the freedom and facilities to send personnel to that neutral state to explain to all the prisoners of war depending on these nations so as to eliminate their apprehensions and to inform them of all matters related to their return to their homelands, particularly of their full right to return home to lead a peaceful life.

"Fourth, within 1 month after the arrival of the prisoners of war in the neutral state, and after the explanations made by the nations to which they belong, the speedy return to their fatherlands of all those prisoners of war who request repatriation shall be facilitated by the authorities of the neutral state concerned, and there should be no obstruction. The administrative details of the repatriation of such prisoners of war shall be settled through consultation between the authorities of the neutral state concerned and the authorities of the nations to which the prisoners of war belong.

"Fifth, if, at the expiration of the time limit of 6 months stipulated in paragraphs 3 and 4 of the present proposal, there are still prisoners of war in the custody of the neutral state, their disposition shall be submitted, for settlement through consultation, to the political conference provided in paragraph 60, article IV of the armistice agreement.

"Sixth, all the expenditures of the prisoners of war during their stay in the neutral state, including their traveling expenses in returning to their fatherlands, shall be borne by the nations to which they belong."]

Following the presentation of the Communist proposal, General Harrison pointed out that certain arrangements were outlined in his letter to the Communists of April 16. These were:

1. The neutral state of a nation such as Switzerland, traditionally recognized as appropriate in matters of this kind.

2. That in the interest of practicality, prisoners of war who are not directly repatriated be released in custody in Korea of the neutral state.

3. That after a reasonable time, such as 60 days, during which opportunity has been afforded by the neutral state to parties concerned for determining the attitudes of the individuals in its custody, the neutral state will make arrangements for peaceable disposition of those remaining in its custody.

General Harrison then pointed out that the UNC does not consider that the physical removal of prisoners to points outside of Korea is justified in any sense. He added that such a move would afford no material advantage and would entail undesirable delays and many practical difficulties, such as time consumed in transportation, housing and administrative accommodations. This, the General said, would delay the release of prisoners by months, and is a very undesirable solution. He emphasized that the neutral state could exercise adequate custody at suitable locations in Korea, and that 6 months was an "utterly exorbitant" time and that prisoners should not be held in custody for that period. "It is our firm opinion," the General said, "that 60 days will be ample for this purpose."

General Harrison summed up for the UNC by stating that the Communists failed to accord acceptable recognition to the arrangements outlined in the letter of April 16. He then proposed a recess until 11 a. m., tomorrow but General Nam Il requested a short recess until 4 p. m., which was agreed to by General Harrison.

Following the recess, General Nam Il said that the time limit of 6 months was "both necessary and reasonable" and Switzerland was unsuitable as the neutral state.

General Harrison, before recessing, again pointed out that there should be no objections on the part of the Com-

¹ Released to the press at Munsan.

munists to Switzerland as the neutral state. Switzerland has for many years been recognized as neutral among the nations of the world and it fulfills all the requirements of a neutral nation.

General Harrison, in his final statement, said, "You have said nothing which would indicate that your proposal is one that we can consider as constituting a reasonable and constructive basis for negotiating an armistice."

APRIL 27 SESSION

The second plenary session of the reopened Armistice talks between the UNC and the Communists went into session at 11 a. m. today at Panmunjom.

Lt. Gen. William K. Harrison, Jr., Senior UNC Delegate, told the Communists that their proposals submitted yesterday would force a prisoner to choose between return to the Communists or face detention without a foreseeable end.

The UNC Chief Delegate opened the session by pointing out that their six point proposal "does not form the basis for an acceptable solution to the prisoner of war question." The General added, "it is obvious that your side failed to consider seriously our letter of 16 April in which we outlined the nature of a solution that is reasonable and constructive and one which would lead to a prompt resolution of the problem of prisoners of war."

The Communists were told by General Harrison that their argument regarding Switzerland as not being suitable as a neutral nation is groundless and a strange one indeed. He added that the Communists' proposal to detain prisoners of war up to 9 months after an armistice is signed, and then even longer while a political conference settles their disposition is neither reasonable nor constructive. "It is unreasonable and obstructive," the General said.

The General again told General Nam Il, senior Communist Delegate that the Communists have proposed nothing that can be considered as a reasonable or constructive basis for an armistice agreement.

The Communists asked for an adjournment at 11:52 a. m. until 11 a. m. tomorrow. The UNC agreed to the request.

APRIL 28 SESSION

Lt. Gen. William K. Harrison, Jr., UNC Senior Delegate, today informed the Communists that it was the hope of the UNC that both sides would be able to agree on a reasonable and honorable armistice which would protect the human rights of the prisoners of war. He went on to say that if the Communists desired an armistice on this basis, they had failed thus far to give any indication of such an objective.

The UNC Chief Delegate stressed that, "We do not intend to become involved in protracted and useless arguments," and that "from your [the Communists'] experience in previous negotiations with us, you should be well aware that we mean what we say."

On the Communists' rejection of Switzerland as the neutral state, General Harrison said, "You have cast doubt on your own intentions to bring about a speedy and honorable truce."

When the Communists were asked if they were prepared to suggest the name of a neutral state, the Communists replied that they had "noted the question" and then immediately proposed a recess until 11 a.m. tomorrow.

APRIL 29 SESSION

An unnamed Asiatic country was proposed today by the Communists as a substitute for the UNC choice of Switzerland as the neutral nation to take custody of prisoners of war who do not wish to be repatriated.

The proposal was made to Lt. Gen. William K. Harrison,

Jr., Senior Delegate for the UNC, by General Nam Il during the fourth session of the reopened plenary talks at Panmunjom.

General Harrison, in his opening statement today, again stressed the selection of Switzerland as the neutral nation in handling prisoners of war and pointed out that "no other nation has comparable experience in this field." He added, "The argument that it is disqualified to serve in this capacity by the fact that it is a member of the neutral nations' supervisory commission is quite groundless."

General Nam Il, on the subject of time required for "explanations" to prisoners who do not wish to be repatriated, said the "specific length of time could be a subject of discussion."

General Harrison pointed out that the transportation of many thousands of prisoners overseas to a neutral nation would, for the great majority of them, constitute deportation and expatriation. "Our side," General Harrison said, "cannot apply force to transport prisoners to a neutral country any more than we can apply force to repatriate them to your side."

The Communists proposed a recess at 12:04 p. m. until 11:00 a. m. tomorrow, which was agreed to by the UNC.

APRIL 30 SESSION

Lt. Gen. William K. Harrison, Jr., Senior UNC Delegate, told the Communists today at the fifth meeting of the reopened armistice discussions at Panmunjom that until the Communists come to an understanding on a neutral nation, "we see no advantage in discussing seriously the other elements of your proposal."

General Harrison further stated, "Not knowing the name of the country of your selection, we, of course, are not able to consider the matter of its neutrality. We do think it worth while, however, to point out that an Asian country is necessarily located very close to countries dominated by Communists and might therefore be subjected to Communist military, economic, or political influence."

On the question of prisoner repatriation, the Senior Delegate of the UNC reminded the Communists that only 12,000 of the 65,000 personnel captured during the first year of hostilities have been listed as POW's in December 1951 and that a majority of the missing had been incorporated illegally into the People's Army.

This practice violates the Geneva Convention which requires that POW's be protected from the effects of military operations and that they not be employed in labor contributing directly to military operations. The General said:

"It would seem appropriate that these Koreans whom we are still holding as prisoners and who want to live in South Korea should be released without further delay to enter into civilian life of their fellow Koreans rather than be retained indefinitely as they might under your proposal. It has always seemed strange to us that the representatives of Communist China should insist that native Koreans who refuse to return to North Korea and seek to live in South Korea should be forced to return to

The United States in the United Nations

"The United States in the United Nations," which has been a regular feature of the BULLETIN, is being discontinued with this issue because of space limitations. The BULLETIN will continue to print texts of major U.S. statements made at U.N. meetings, texts of important U.N. resolutions and other documents, Current United Nations Documents: A Selected Bibliography, and material relating to the U.N. Command operations in Korea.

North Korea. The obviously humane thing would be to release the Korean prisoners who are now in our hands. Such release would also greatly simplify the whole problem of repatriation and the work of the custodial state.

"In view of the advantages to all concerned, a proposal by your side at this time to release in South Korea all Korean prisoners who have refused to return to Communist Korea would greatly facilitate agreement on an armistice and would be received with acclaim by all decent and humane people throughout the entire world."

The meeting adjourned until 11 a. m. tomorrow morning.

Ambassador Murphy To Assist in Armistice Negotiations

Press release 221 dated April 28

The Department of State announced on April 28 that Ambassador Robert D. Murphy is terminating his duties as Ambassador to Japan on April 29, but his departure from Japan has been temporarily postponed to permit him to continue in Tokyo to assist CINCPAC [Commander in Chief of the U.N. Command, Gen. Mark W. Clark] in his conduct of the armistice negotiations. President Eisenhower has accorded Mr. Murphy the personal rank of Ambassador in connection with his temporary assignment.

Ambassador Murphy's duties in this connection do not imply any change in the military character of the armistice negotiations nor in General Clark's responsibilities with regard thereto.

As soon as conditions permit, Mr. Murphy will return to the United States to take up his new post as Assistant Secretary of State for U.N. Affairs.

Termination of Sulphur Committee

The Sulphur Committee of the International Materials Conference (Imc) announced on April 13 that its members have agreed to the dissolution of the Committee on April 30, 1953. This announcement follows the Committee's recent decision to discontinue international allocation of crude sulfur as from March 1, and reflects the continuing improvement in the supply and demand position of sulfur in the free world.

The Sulphur Committee, which was the second of the commodity groups to be established within the framework of the Imc, met for the first time on March 1, 1951. The Committee's recommendations for the first international allocations of crude sulfur were accepted by its member governments for the third quarter of 1951 and allocations were continued on a quarterly or half-yearly basis until March 1, 1953.

The following countries were represented on the Committee: Australia, Belgium (representing Benelux), Brazil, Canada, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, India, Italy, Japan, Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, the Union of South Africa, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

Current U.N. Documents: A Selected Bibliography¹

Economic and Social Council

Report of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. E/2360/Add.1, Mar. 12, 1953. 22 pp. mimeo.

Inter-Governmental Organizations. Relations With Inter-Governmental Organizations. Report by the Secretary-General. E/2366, Feb. 17, 1953. 21 pp. mimeo.

International Action for Conservation and Utilization of Non-Agricultural Resources. Report by the Secretary-General on activities under Council resolution 345 (XII). E/2367, Feb. 23, 1953. 8 pp. mimeo.

Inter-Agency Agreements and Agreements Between Agencies and Other Inter-Governmental Organizations. Letter dated 16 February 1953 from the Director-General of WHO to the Secretary-General. E/2369, Feb. 24, 1953. 4 pp. mimeo.

Allegations Regarding Infringements of Trade Union Rights Received Under Council Resolution 277 (X). Observations of the Permanent Representative of Greece to the United Nations on the communication from the Federation of Greek Maritime Unions, Cardiff, England (Document E/2333/Add.21). E/2371, Feb. 27, 1953. 5 pp. mimeo.

United Nations Narcotics Laboratory. Note by the Secretary-General. E/2372, Feb. 27, 1953. 9 pp. mimeo.

Technical Assistance for Economic Development Provided Under General Assembly Resolution 200 (III). Note by the Secretary-General. E/2375, Feb. 27, 1953. 8 pp. mimeo.

Inter-Governmental Organizations. Means for Furthering the Completion of the International One-Millionth Map of the World. Report by the Secretary-General. E/2376, Mar. 5, 1953. 36 pp. mimeo.

Plight of Survivors of Nazi Concentration Camps. Fourth Progress Report by the Secretary-General. E/2378, Mar. 10, 1953. 6 pp. mimeo.

Economic Development of Under-Developed Countries: Integrated Economic Development. Working paper by the Secretary-General (Council resolution 416 F (XIV)). E/2384, Mar. 25, 1953. 30 pp. mimeo.

Notes on the Draft Annual Report of ECAFE to Ecosoc. Statement submitted by ICRU Delegation in connection with the Annual Report of the Commission to the Economic and Social Council. E/CN.11/NGO/6, Feb. 12, 1953. 4 pp. mimeo.

United Nations Opium Conference. Illicit Traffic in Opium. Note by the Secretary-General. E/CONF. 14/9, Mar. 19, 1953. 19 pp. mimeo.

Additional Note to the Reports of the Committees [Economic Commission for Europe] by the Executive Secretary. E/ECE/153-H, Rev. 1, Feb. 12, 1953. 28 pp. mimeo.

Report of the International Children's Centre on the Work of Its Services for the Year 1952. E/ICEF/216, Jan. 30, 1953. 190 pp. mimeo.

¹ Printed materials may be secured in the United States from the International Documents Service, Columbia University Press, 2960 Broadway, New York 27, N. Y. Other materials (mimeographed or processed documents) may be consulted at certain designated libraries in the United States.

The United Nations Secretariat has established an Official Records series for the General Assembly, the Security Council, the Economic and Social Council, the Trusteeship Council, and the Atomic Energy Commission, which includes summaries of proceedings, resolutions, and reports of the various commissions and committees. Information on securing subscriptions to the series may be obtained from the International Documents Service.

Reports of U.N. Command Operations in Korea¹

FIFTY-SEVENTH REPORT: FOR THE PERIOD NOVEMBER 1-15, 1952

U.N. doc. S/2970
Dated March 31, 1953

[Excerpts]

I herewith submit report number 57 of the United Nations Command Operations in Korea for the period 1-15 November 1952, inclusive. United Nations Command communiques numbers 1420-1437 provide detailed accounts of these operations.

The Armistice negotiations continued in recess.

In early November two significant incidents occurred which provided additional factual evidence that intelligence activities within pro-Communist Prisoner of War camps were continuing with strong efforts being made to maintain contact with outside agencies. In the predawn hours of 5 November, two North Korean Communist Prisoners of War were apprehended while attempting to escape from United Nations Prisoner of War Camp Number One, Koje-Do. Carefully sewed into the clothing of one prisoner were six petitions addressed to North Korean and Chinese officials; a hand-drawn map of Korea; a map of Koje-Do indicating troop disposition of United Nations Command security forces, as seen from their enclosure; a partial list of military units on Koje-Do; a diary of a Communist party member; two homemade flags, and a crude compass. The petitions followed same type of Communist propaganda line which appeared on flags and banners prior to decentralization of Prisoner of War population, which occurred at Koje-Do in June 1952. Fantastic accusations and threats against United Nations Command were followed by appeals for help and promises of continued harassing measures.

During an interrogation of a Prisoner of War at Koje-Do who had escaped 17 October and was recaptured 19 November, the prisoner admitted he had delivered a package containing coded documents and petitions of type similar to that mentioned above to a pre-determined individual at the Pusan railroad station. He was able to identify his contact by a peculiar manner of dress and three code words.

¹ Transmitted to the Security Council by the U.S. representative to the U.N. on Mar. 30. Text of the 50th report appears in the BULLETIN of Dec. 15, 1952, p. 958; the 51st and 52d reports, Dec. 29, 1952, p. 1034; the 53d report, Jan. 26, 1953, p. 155; the 54th report, Feb. 9, 1953, p. 224; the 55th report, Feb. 16, 1953, p. 276; and the 56th report, Mar. 2, 1953, p. 348.

These efforts were obviously part of the overall network which had been covertly built up by Communist agencies in North Korea to utilize captured personnel in the United Nations Command's custody as a part of their military objectives. A study prepared by the United Nations Command and due for public release in January discusses the background of this subversive movement and clearly establishes the control which Communist negotiators exercised over a series of riots and incidents of violence which have occurred in the United Nations Command camps during the past year. Many of these incidents have been of a nature or on a scale requiring suppression by force with resultant deaths and injuries. The Communists have used every opportunity to propagandize such outbreaks. The connection between incidents and their propaganda exploitation is by no means accidental. While details of this phase of war which the Communists wage in United Nations Command camps will shortly be known, the conclusions, arrived at after exhaustive research, are of particular interest.

From the Koje-Do outbreak came the confirmation that the Communist high command, undeterred by provisions of the Geneva Convention or any other humane considerations, would use every means, including murder, to maintain its hold on those of its personnel captured by the other side and to expend them in whatever actions would hurt or weaken the enemy. A Communist Prisoner of War therefore, had to be regarded by the Communist not as a passive human being in need of care and protection until he could be returned to his home but as still an active soldier determined to fight on in whatever way his leaders dictated.

This warfare through prisoners did not require that they possess arms in enough strength to overwhelm their guards and enter into large scale military operations. They were to break out if they could and join the nearest irregulars, but they were told this in an attempt to fire their imaginations, rather than in expectation of accomplishment. Military objectives would be served no less, the Communist high command thought, if they created incidents which would make it necessary for their guards to use force against Prisoners of War, resulting in deaths and injuries which could be represented to peoples in both Communist and free countries as convincing evidence of the "brutality" and "inhumanity" of the United Nations Command and especially of the United States. The loss of Communist lives—as many hundreds or even

thousands of them as might be necessary—was a small price to pay for gaining propaganda material to accomplish two purposes; first, to turn free world opinion against the United States and thereby to weaken U.S. leadership in the resistance to Communism; and, second, to unify public opinion in Communist lands against the United Nations cause.

Over the years, the Communists had become very familiar with the effect on public opinion of reports, whether true or false, of inhumane treatment of human beings. Though by no means moved, except to be even more secretive about it, by disclosures of their own widespread and flagrant disregard for the dignity of the human individual and sanctity of his life, they had seen time and again the horrified reaction of even many of their own friends in non-Communist countries. The leveling of similar charges against opponents became a standard practice in their own propaganda. When they had nothing concrete on which to base such propaganda, they manufactured something, such as the germ-warfare hoax against the United Nations Command in Korea. The mission required of the Communist prisoners on Koje-Do was to provide a better propaganda base of this kind and such importance was attached to it that no efforts were spared to build up a fantastically elaborate organization in the Prisoner of War compounds.

Enlightened by this knowledge, the United Nations Command moved swiftly to block Communist warfare through the Koje-Do prisoners. Prisoners who were confirmed Communists, as indicated by their readiness to return to Communist territory, were dispersed into smaller and more easily handled groups on Koje-Do and nearby islands. Compounds were built for an average of 500 to 600 men. A much stricter regime was instituted. Compound inspections by camp authorities were more frequent, including thorough searches for contraband. Security forces were strengthened. In some places, to reduce the opportunity for clandestine activities, a curfew was enforced from 1900 to 0500 hours. Intelligence systems were expanded to gain fuller information as to what was going on in the compounds and especially to identify subversive leaders.

To make it more difficult for the Communist prisoners to receive and send messages from and to the high command in North Korea a native village and isolated civilian homes which formerly sheltered agents, were moved out of the camp area on Koje-Do. Steps were taken to prevent the carrying of oral instructions by agents disguised as soldiers who surrendered at the front. Use of Prisoner of War hospitals as the internal communications center for transmission of messages between compounds and enclosures was broken up, and the establishment of a substitute center was made next to impossible.

Despite these measures and others permissible under the Geneva Convention, it was apparent that Communist Prisoner of War leaders were still organized, and were capable of continuing their warfare against the United Nations Command. The timing of outbreaks to synchronize with developments in the armistice negotiations or elsewhere would be handicapped by the loss of communications, but the leaders among the prisoners were

well enough acquainted with the purposes and methods of the party and the army command to know without further instructions, that incidents at any time could be exploited. Constant and close surveillance might deprive prisoners of the advantage of surprise, but there can be no guarantee that control measures now in force will prevent the fanatical Communist leaders from throwing away the lives of those they dominate.

Throughout the remainder of the Prisoner of War Command scattered incidents occurred in pro-Communist camps similar to those which have been experienced during the past several months. There were no such incidents in the anti-Communist camps.

Except for a few hundred individuals still hospitalized and undergoing medical treatment at the United Nations Command Hospital, Pusan, all of the 11,000 civilian internees included in Operation THANKSGIVING were released from custody, and were being resettled in the civilian economy of the Republic of Korea.

Through the medium of radio and leaflets, detailed information on developments in the United Nations General Assembly was made available to peoples living under Communist tyranny in North Korea. In these radio broadcasts and leaflets the United Nations endeavor to achieve an armistice in Korea and lasting peace throughout the world was kept in the foreground. United Nations Command proposals at Panmunjom and United Nations Command readiness to discuss constructive Communist proposals were reiterated in daily informational output. Meanwhile, the Communist leaders have attempted to instill in the peoples under their control the belief that the recess in negotiations constitutes a final break-off.

Rear Admiral B. Hall Hanlon, United States Navy, on 10 November was announced as Assistant Chief of Staff, J-5 (Civil Affairs), United Nations Command, effective with the establishment of the Joint Staff. Admiral Hanlon has served in Korea as the Deputy Commander for Civil Affairs, Korean Communications Zone, and as the Commander in Chief's United Nations Command representative on the Combined Economic Board in Korea. Admiral Hanlon will continue as the Commander in Chief's United Nations Command representative on the Combined Economic Board in addition to his function as Assistant Chief of Staff, J-5 for Civil Affairs.

Under the terms of the Economic Coordination Agreement of May 24, 1952, the United States Government on 7 November paid \$17,987,671.43 to the Republic of Korea. This amount represented a \$4,000,000 monthly payment on account for won expended for bonafide military uses, June through September inclusive, together with payment for won sold to troops during period May through August inclusive. To date three such payments have been made to the Republic of Korea, totaling \$65,638,209.07.

Preliminary results of the crop survey conducted to estimate the Republic of Korea rice crop for the current food year indicate that approximately thirteen million suk of brown rice will be produced (1 suk=5.12 bushels). This figure is reported by the United Nations Command members of the crop survey team; Republic of Korea members have not as yet released their estimates. Dur-

ing the period 1940-44 the annual average rice production was 13,718,516 suk, and during the period 1946-50 the annual average was 14,145,444 suk. By comparison with these figures for previous years, the estimate for this year's crop shows that the Republic of Korea rice production will be approximately normal.

The first class of Republic of Korea merchant seamen will arrive on 17 November at Yokosuka, Japan, for merchant marine training to be conducted by the United Nations Command. The students will be housed and subsisted on a cargo barge converted at a cost of \$48,000 for the purpose. The program provides for training of 480 Republic of Korea seamen during the next twelve months. Classes will consist of forty students and will be of thirty days duration.

FIFTY-EIGHTH REPORT: FOR THE PERIOD NOVEMBER 16-30, 1952

U.N. doc. S/2971
Dated March 31, 1953

[Excerpts]

I herewith submit report number 58 of the United Nations Command Operations in Korea for the period 16-30 November 1952, inclusive. United Nations Command communiques numbers 1438-1449 provide detailed accounts of these operations.

Armistice negotiations continued in recess. On the 20th of November 1952 the Senior United Nations Command delegate again requested the Communists to permit captured personnel in their custody to receive individual parcels through the mail exchange which is now in operation. The letter which the Communists have ignored is quoted:

On 6 October 1952 I addressed a letter to you requesting that your side permit our captured personnel in your custody to receive individual parcels through the mail exchange which is now in operation. The United Nations Command further offered the same facilities for the captured personnel of your side whom we hold in custody.

In an effort to simplify the administrative handling by your side and to expedite delivery of these parcels, I further offered for your consideration an easy and workable plan which would not impose any exceptional burden on your logistic capabilities. Although our proposal was fully bilateral and based solely on the humanitarian motive of bringing some measure of comfort to the captured personnel of both sides, you have to date failed even to acknowledge receipt of my communication.

As I have previously pointed out, the approach of winter and the hardships imposed by cold weather make it particularly desirable to take all possible steps at this time to enable the captured personnel of both sides to receive relief parcels. Further, the nearness of the holiday and New Year seasons, which many of the captured personnel of both sides customarily observe as a period of special spiritual and familiar significance, makes it especially appropriate that these deliveries should be undertaken with minimum delay. Since it is clearly the right of prisoners of war under the Geneva Convention to receive individual parcels, it is inconceivable that you should continue to deny the prisoners of both sides the simple and harmless benefits of the exchange of parcels which I again propose.

I reiterate that the United Nations Command is prepared to implement our part of this proposal without delay. Again I express my sincere hope for your early and favorable reply.

There were no other developments in the armistice negotiations during the period.

In the few scattered incidents which occurred in pro-Communist Prisoner of War camps no particular trend could be discerned other than that of pure harassment. At Koje-do, on 25 November, three prisoners of war of one inclosure assaulted without provocation an unarmed United States aid man at the inclosure aid station and then fled to their compound. Orders which were issued immediately by camp authorities for the three prisoners responsible to report to the inclosure command post were refused and two platoons of trained Republic of Korea Army Infantry entered the compound and removed the three offenders. During the forcible segregation of these individuals, twenty-nine prisoners were slightly injured. About fifteen minutes after this first incident a similar one occurred in another inclosure when three prisoners of a group of thirty-five who were on a work detail assaulted, again without provocation, a United States work supervisor. After the work detail returned to their inclosure a United States Infantry platoon entered the inclosure service yard and dispersed the work detail which was then displaying an obviously defiant attitude. The three prisoners of war who had committed the assault were removed.

The camp authorities at Koje-do reported that incidents of this type would probably continue for a period of several days as part of carefully planned violence. Information, as yet incomplete, had been uncovered which indicated that prisoner groups had been ordered by subversive elements to create incidents while International Committee of the Red Cross delegates were at Koje-do on a routine inspection and visit.

Repeated radio and leaflet warnings were employed to inform North Korea civilians of impending United Nations Command air attacks on military targets and to urge them to evacuate their families to safety. The effects of the campaign are considerable in spite of Communist efforts to prevent these humanitarian warnings from reaching the people.

United Nations devotion to peace in a world threatened by Communist aggression was reiterated. Maximum dissemination was given to information concerning United Nations functions and development, stressing the identification of the United Nations with peace and human rights. Reports indicate that the people of North Korea receive only a distorted picture of the United Nations through the enemy's controlled propaganda channels.

The estimated dollar value of civil assistance to Korea for the period 1 July 1950 to 31 October 1952, totals \$577,926,319. Approximately 96 per cent of this amount has been contributed by the United States, including \$328,136,088 for supplies and equipment and an estimated \$225,000,000 in services. United Nations members and other free nations contributed \$11,628,831, United States voluntary agencies \$10,797,874 and United Nations voluntary agencies \$2,363,526. A total of thirty-four countries, four United Nations voluntary agencies and twenty-six United States voluntary agencies are now participating in the Korean Aid Program. As contributing countries, Thailand led with an estimated dollar value

of \$4,368,000 in rice. The Philippines were second with \$1,875,468 in rice, and Nationalist China third with \$617,130 in relief supplies. The American Relief for Korea, Inc., gave the largest non-governmental contribution, totaling \$3,871,145. The War Relief Service of the National Catholic Welfare Conference was second with \$3,623,492.

At the 19 November meeting of the Combined Economic Board, a joint proposal was made for the free allocation of veterinary drugs and supplies to establish and maintain 200 veterinary clinics in Korea for six months. These clinics will be established at the National Veterinary Institute, two Veterinary Colleges, one High School, several livestock Breeding Stations, and in each major city area throughout the Republic of Korea, to treat animal disease and conserve livestock. It is estimated that in six months' time the clinics will be able to begin paying an increasing percentage of the cost of supplies.

A Seminar-workshop program currently is being held in Pusan for 180 educators from all Republic of Korea provinces. Conducted by members of the American Education Mission, the seminars cover five major areas of education, including teaching and learning; fundamental philosophy of education; administration, and child development and guidance. The six members of the American Education Mission, who were recruited for the Unitarian Services Committee, will spend nine months in Korea on a technical assistance program.

An appropriation of \$1,845,000 has been made by United Nations Korea Reconstruction Agency for the orphan's program. Projects to be financed by this appropriation have been prepared by the Joint United Nations Civil Assistance Command Korea-United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency-Republic of Korea Child Welfare Committee, which was established on 6 October for the purpose of studying, analyzing and coordinating child welfare plans and activities. Three projects have been proposed, which include the establishment of a child welfare center and a rational model and training institution in each province; extension and improvement of the best existing educational institutions, and the establishment of three vocational training institutions.

FIFTY-NINTH REPORT: FOR THE PERIOD DECEMBER 1-15, 1952

U.N. doc. S/2972
Dated March 31, 1953

[Excerpts]

I herewith submit report number 59 of the United Nations Command Operations in Korea for the period 1-15 December 1952, inclusive. United Nations Command communiques numbers 1450-1464 provide detailed accounts of these operations.

There were no meetings of the Armistice Delegations as the negotiations continued in recess. Developments in the United Nations General Assembly were followed closely as possibly leading to the resumption of the negotiations. The rejection of the Indian resolution by the Chinese Communist and North Korean authorities made it appear that the Communists will continue to insist on an

Armistice on their own terms, and that they will continue to demand the repatriation of all prisoners of war.

The number of incidents in the pro-communist prisoner of war camps which occurred during the preceding several weeks continued to increase. On 6 December 1952, the prisoner of war command reported indications that plans were being formulated for a mass outbreak within the United Nations Command prisoner of war and internee camps. Coded documents had been intercepted in several of the compounds. The code was broken by the authorities and the documents disclosed plans for mass break. The code appeared to be common throughout the main camp and the branch camp areas, indicating that the plan was centrally directed. The date and the time that these plans were to be operative was not known.

An investigation was initiated at once. All camp commanders were acquainted with the situation and were directed to take every precaution to negate any attempt by the internees to put such plans into effect. Eight days after the first reports became available, the plot matured into violence. At noon on December 14, reports came to the commander of the camp that internees in two of the camp compounds were massing. It was evident that immediate action was necessary to prevent the rioters from breaking out of their compounds and inciting their fellows in the six other compounds to attempt similar action. The compound commander, with a small detachment of United States and Republic of Korea guards, had to act at once to prevent many hundreds of internees from breaking out of their compounds and inviting pitched battles.

The necessity for using force to repress inspired and centrally directed outbursts of fanatical violence by prisoners is, at times, unavoidable. That such unavoidable use of force should result in casualties is no evidence that force was not required. The communist authorities have no regard for human life. This is evidenced by their frequent exploitation of their own prisoners of war by inspiring them to a state of fanatical disregard of their own lives. The prisoner of war disturbances caused by the Communists are directed towards embarrassing the United Nations Command and aimed at reaping propaganda benefits, particularly if the United Nations Command can be forced into a situation where force must be used to control the prisoners of war. On the military side, the prisoner of war disturbances are designed to divert United Nations Command Forces from front-line duty.

In all of the camps housing anti-Communist prisoners of war there were no incidents during this period, and interior administration and gradual improvement of facilities continued at a satisfactory rate.

Developments in the United Nations General Assembly relating to the Indian proposal for resolving the prisoner repatriation issue were reported extensively in informational media directed to enemy troops and to North Korean civilians. In connection with the Indian proposal, United Nations Command efforts to achieve peace in Korea and United Nations Command determination to adhere to the humanitarian principle of non-forcible repatriation were reiterated.

May 11, 1953

Demilitarization of Jammu and Kashmir

FIFTH REPORT BY THE U. N. REPRESENTATIVE FOR INDIA AND PAKISTAN

On March 27 Frank P. Graham, U. N. representative for India and Pakistan, transmitted to the Secretary-General his fifth report to the Security Council (U. N. doc. S/2967).¹ In the report, Mr. Graham reviewed the suggestions made by him in his efforts to assist the two Governments to reach an agreement on the demilitarization of Jammu and Kashmir, including the latest exploratory suggestions made at Geneva.

Part I of the report reviews suggestions regarding proposal 7 of the 12 proposals for an agreement on demilitarization; Part II (not printed here) points out the values of inducting the Plebiscite Administrator into office at an early fixed time; Part III (not printed here) refers to assurances regarding the August 13, 1948, and January 5, 1949 resolutions; Part IV (a portion of which is printed here) summarizes the negotiations since the meeting of the Security Council on December 23, 1952; Part V emphasizes the importance to the people of the State, the two nations, and the world of an agreement on the Kashmir dispute. Five annexes (not printed here) are attached to the report.

U.N. doc. S 2967
Dated March 27, 1953 [Excerpts]

Number and Character of Forces

A. The Suggestions on Proposal Seven Regarding The Number and Character of Forces

Early in his consultations with the two Governments on the sub-continent in July and August 1951, the United Nations Representative found (1) that the Government of India maintained that there should remain in the territory to be evacuated by the Pakistan army a civil force; and (2) that the Government of Pakistan maintained that after withdrawals and reductions there should, in general, be a military balance on the respective sides. In

¹ For excerpts from the 1st report, see BULLETIN of Nov. 5, 1951, p. 738; from the 2d, *ibid.*, Jan. 14, 1952, p. 52; from the 3d, *ibid.*, May 5, 1952, p. 712; and from the 4th, *ibid.*, Oct. 20, 1952, p. 626.

an effort to discover whether there were circumstances under which one or the other of these positions could become the basis of an agreement, the United Nations Representative made certain suggestions to the two Governments as a basis for their negotiation.

The first proposals were made on 7 September 1951.²

Proposal seven read as follows:

"7. Agree that the demilitarization shall be carried out in such a way that at the end of the period referred to in paragraph 6 above the situation will be:

A. On the Pakistan side of the cease-fire line:

(i) the tribesmen and Pakistan nationals not normally resident therein who had entered the State for the purpose of fighting will have been withdrawn;

(ii) The Pakistan troops will have been withdrawn from the State, and

(iii) large-scale disbandment and disarmament of the Azad Kashmir forces will have taken place.

B. On the Indian side of the cease-fire line:

(i) the bulk of the Indian forces in the State will have been withdrawn;

(ii) further withdrawals or reductions, as the case may be, of the Indian and State Armed forces remaining in the State after the completion of the operation referred to in B (i) above will have been carried out;

so that at the end of the period referred to in paragraph 6 above there will remain on the present Pakistan side of the cease-fire line a force of — Civil Armed Forces, and on the Indian side of the cease-fire line a force of —."

In response to this proposal, the Prime Minister of India, on 11 September 1951, stated *inter alia*:

"... the Government of India will retain on their side of the cease-fire line in Jammu and Kashmir, One Line of Communication Area Headquarters and One Infantry Division (normal) but of four brigades of four battalions each,³ at the end of the period agreed upon in terms of paragraphs 6 and 9 of the proposals, provided that the operations described in paragraph 7.A (i) (ii) and (iii) of the proposals have been completed by the end of that period. Thus much more than the 'bulk of Indian forces in the State' will have been withdrawn and I wish to emphasize that the forces left behind will be wholly inadequate to resist any large-scale aggression. Effective measures to prevent such aggression will, it is presumed, be taken by Pakistan."

² *Ibid.*, Nov. 5, 1951, p. 740.

³ Interpreted by India to be in the order of 28,000 men.

The Prime Minister of India in the same letter further stated:

"As regards the Civil Armed Forces to be maintained on the Pakistan side of the cease-fire line at the end of the period agreed upon in terms of paragraph 6 and paragraph 9, the Government of India would agree to a force of 4,000, organized, equipped and composed as recommended to UNCIP in C of the memorandum transmitted to Dr. Lozano under cover of letter No. 248-PASG/49 dated 13 April 1949, by their Secretary-General in the Ministry of External Affairs."

The Prime Minister of Pakistan on 12 September 1951 stated, *inter alia*, that his Government

"... consider that a force of not more than four infantry battalions (with the necessary administrative units)* should remain on each side of the cease-fire line at the end of the demilitarization programme envisaged in paragraph 7. These figures are based on a careful consideration of all relevant factors such as, area, terrain, size and distribution of population on the two sides of the cease-fire line.

"The Pakistan Government are, however, of the view that so long as the forces on each side of the cease-fire line are of the order indicated above, some slight difference in the strength or description of the two forces should not stand in the way of an agreement being reached."

In his statement to the Security Council on 17 January 1952, the United Nations Representative summarized the positions of the two Governments as follows:

"... it should be noted that, as a result of three informal exploratory discussions at military level, India agreed to withdraw an additional 7,000 of its armed forces. This would bring the Indian and State armed forces down to 21,000, exclusive of the State Militia of 6,000, which it seems would be a proportion of perhaps over 75 per cent of the Indian and State armed forces present in the State at the time of the cease-fire on 1 January 1949.

"The Representative of Pakistan indicated that any proportionate reduction, however heavy, would be matched on the Pakistan-Azad Kashmir side of the cease-fire line as an inter-dependent part of a continuous process in the proposed programme of demilitarization.

"The official replies of India and Pakistan to the basic questions asked by the United Nations Representative made formal the wide differences between the two Governments on the most basic questions.

"With the additional reduction of 7,000 armed forces, India held the position that at the end of the period of demilitarization there should be on the Indian side of the line 21,000 Indian and State armed forces, exclusive of the State Militia of 6,000, and there should be on the other side of the line a civil armed force of 2,000 and an unarmed civil force of 2,000, half of whom were to be followers of Azad Kashmir and half of whom were not to be followers of Azad Kashmir, as specified above.

"Pakistan maintained that at the end of the period of demilitarization there should be approximately 4,000 armed forces on each side of the cease-fire line, but for the sake of an agreement would accept a slight disparity in favour of India.

"The wide difference in the number of armed forces proposed by the two Governments to be left on each side of the cease-fire line at the end of the period of demilitarization made it clear that no agreement could be reached on Proposal 7 at this time."

In his Second Report the United Nations Representative suggested for the consideration of the parties that pro-

* This memorandum states that half of this force should be armed and half unarmed; half should be followers of Azad Kashmir and half not followers of Azad Kashmir.

* In the order of 4,000 men.

posals seven should be revised to provide that at the end of the demilitarization period:

"... there will remain on each side of the cease-fire line the lowest possible number of armed forces based in proportion on the number of armed forces existing on each side of the cease-fire line on 1 January 1949".

Following this proposal a wide difference in the positions of the two Governments on proposal seven still persisted regarding the number and character of forces to be left at the end of the period of demilitarization.

In view of the continuing differences between the two Governments, the United Nations Representative believed it might be useful if he made suggestions on numbers for the consideration of the parties in their negotiations.

In July 1952 the United Nations Representative suggested for the consideration of the two Governments that they attempt to agree on figures within the brackets of 3,000 to 6,000 armed forces on the territory to be evacuated by the Pakistan Army, and Indian army forces of 12,000 to 18,000 on the Indian side. These figures did not include either the 3,500 Gilgit and Northern Scouts in the evacuated territory or the 6,000 State Militia on the Indian side.

In the Geneva Conference in September 1952 the United Nations Representative suggested the definite figures of 6,000 and 18,000 for the respective sides, exclusive of the Scouts and the State Militia. This suggestion was followed by the suggestion that criteria be established by which definite figures might be agreed upon at a military conference to be held after the signing of a truce agreement.

No agreement having been reached between the two Governments at the Geneva Conference or during the meetings of the Security Council held in October, November and December 1952, the United Nations Representative, in the Conference held in Geneva in February 1953, referred to in Part IV below, suggested that the Governments consider for discussion the proposal mentioned therein.

While during the negotiations on paragraph seven there has been some narrowing of the gap between the positions of the two Governments on the question of the number and character of the forces to remain on each side of the cease-fire line at the end of the period of demilitarization, a substantial difference in position still remains.

B. The United Nations Representative, as a Mediator, has made a Series of Suggestions in an Attempt to Determine whether a Basis can be found for an Agreement between the two Governments on the Character and Number of Forces

The United Nations Representative makes no preferential brief for the lower figures of 3,000 to 12,000 or the higher figures of 6,000 to 21,000. As a mediator whose responsibility has been to keep striving for an agreement he has hoped that a basis for the negotiation of an agreement might be found. He hoped, for example, that the figures 6,000 and 18,000 with the accompanying provisions would be found adequate for fulfilling the respective functions: in the evacuated territory, of preserving law and order and the cease-fire line from violations; and on the Indian side of the line, of preserving law and order and the cease-fire line from violations, including meeting the needs in relation to defence.

In the belief that there will be no deliberate and responsible violation of the cease-fire line from either side, it is nevertheless important that there be alertness on both sides of the line against the possibility of attempted violation by any possible irresponsible elements.

It appears obvious that India under the two resolutions has some larger responsibilities on her side of the cease-fire line than the local authorities have in the evacuated territory on the other side of the cease-fire line.

* BULLETIN of Jan. 14, 1952, p. 54.

Without recognition of the Azad Kashmir Government and without prejudice to the sovereignty of the State, it also appears obvious, by the nature of the cease-fire line and the temporary exercise of the necessary and useful functions of the local authorities, that (with the withdrawal of the tribesmen and of the Pakistani nationals not normally resident therein who entered the State for the purpose of fighting, and with the withdrawal of the Pakistan army and authority and the large scale disarming and disbanding of the Azad Kashmir forces) there should be in the evacuated territory effective local authorities and effective armed forces. In the "Azad Kashmir" territory these armed forces would be organized out of the remainder of the Azad Kashmir forces without armour or artillery, and thereafter would be commanded by local officers under the local authorities, under the surveillance of the United Nations.

Proposal seven takes on much added significance because agreement on it would prepare the way for the induction of the Plebiscite Administrator into office at a definite time as provided in proposal ten of the twelve proposals.

Conference in Geneva from 4 to 19 February 1953¹

The Conference in Geneva may be divided into two different stages as follows:

(1) Consideration of UNCIP resolutions of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949

The first meeting of the Conference took place on 4 February 1953 and was confined to discussion of the procedure to be followed. The United Nations Representative made a statement in which he stated, *inter alia*,

"I should like to propose that we start with the examination of the resolution of 13 August 1948, Part by Part. In this way we may determine to what extent the resolution has already been implemented, and define, as completely as possible, the obstacles which have until now impeded the implementation of those parts which have not yet been carried into effect. I hope that with regard to each of such obstacles it will be possible for the Governments concerned to indicate the conditions under which the obstacles might be removed."

It was agreed that,

(a) the discussion would start with the consideration of Part I (Cease-fire Order) of the resolution of the UNCIP of 13 August 1948, followed by Part II (Truce Agreement) of that resolution, and

(b) the discussion of Part II would be initiated with consideration of paragraph A, sub-paragraphs 1 and 2, and paragraph B, sub-paragraphs 1 and 2, and then, if agreement were reached on those points, examination of paragraph A, sub-paragraph 3, and B, sub-paragraph 3, would take place.

The representatives of India and Pakistan, assuming that Part I (Cease-fire Order) of the UNCIP's 13 August 1948 resolution had been implemented, began discussion of Part II. After the two representatives had expressed their points of view, it was agreed that the discussion would be confined at least in the initial stages to the implementation of Part II (Truce Agreement) of the UNCIP resolution of 13 August 1948. The discussion was confined to paragraph A, sub-paragraphs 1 and 2 and paragraph B, sub-paragraphs 1 and 2, which read as follows:

¹ Sir Girja Shankar Bajpai headed the Indian delegation at Geneva; Sir Zafullah Khan, Foreign Minister of Pakistan, headed his country's delegation.

(UNCIP'S RESOLUTION OF 13 AUGUST 1948)

"Part II

"Truce agreement

A.

"1. As the presence of troops of Pakistan in the territory of the State of Jammu and Kashmir constitutes a material change in the situation since it was represented by the Government of Pakistan before the Security Council, the Government of Pakistan agrees to withdraw its troops from that State.

"2. The Government of Pakistan will use its best endeavour to secure the withdrawal from the State of Jammu and Kashmir of tribesmen and Pakistani nationals not normally resident therein who have entered the State for the purpose of fighting."

B.

"1. When the Commission shall have notified the Government of India that the tribesmen and Pakistani nationals referred to in part II, A, 2 hereof have withdrawn, thereby terminating the situation which was represented by the Government of India to the Security Council as having occasioned the presence of Indian forces in the State of Jammu and Kashmir, and further, that the Pakistani forces are being withdrawn from the State of Jammu and Kashmir, the Government of India agrees to begin to withdraw the bulk of its forces from that State in stages to be agreed upon with the Commission.

"2. Pending the acceptance of the conditions for a final settlement of the situation in the State of Jammu and Kashmir, the Indian Government will maintain within the lines existing at the moment of the cease-fire the minimum strength of its forces which in agreement with the Commission are considered necessary to assist the local authorities in the observance of law and order. The Commission will have observers stationed where it deems necessary."

The positions of India and Pakistan in regard to the implementation of this part of the resolution were summarized by the two representatives as follows:

India

"As regards the implementation of B. 1 and 2 of Part II of the Resolution of the 13th August, 1948, India's position is that the Azad Kashmir forces cannot be differentiated from the Pakistan Army of which they are, for all practical purposes, an integral part, and that their numbers, equipment and efficiency constitute a threat to the security of the State. The implementation, therefore, by Pakistan of A. 1 and 2 of Part II of the resolution will not materially diminish this threat which is aggravated by the ease with which, owing to the proximity of Pakistan's military cantonments, these forces could be quickly reinforced by the Pakistan army. So long as agreement regarding the complete disbanding and disarming of the Azad Kashmir forces is not reached, a truce agreement cannot create 'the conditions for a final settlement of the situation in the State of Jammu and Kashmir.' India is, therefore, unable to accept any reduction of its present forces except as part of an overall arrangement which includes not only the withdrawal of Pakistan troops, tribesmen and Pakistan nationals not normally resident in the State who have entered for the purpose of fighting but also agreement on the measures to be adopted for the complete disbanding and disarming of the Azad Kashmir forces."

Pakistan

"It will be seen that under the Resolution the withdrawal of Pakistan troops is contingent upon the withdrawal of the 'bulk' of the Indian Army (Clause B (1)). The UNCIP had explained that 'synchronization of the withdrawal of the armed forces of the two Governments will be arranged between the respective High Commands and the Commission.' (Vide paragraph 10 of Appendix I

to the Commission's letter dated 27th August 1948 to the Foreign Minister of Pakistan).

"It was reaffirmed by the Pakistan Delegation on 5 February 1953 that once a satisfactory truce agreement based on the above principles was arrived at, the Government of Pakistan would proceed to fulfill all the obligations that devolved on it.

"The problem thus resolved itself into one of securing India's agreement to withdraw the 'bulk' of its forces from the State of Jammu and Kashmir as provided for in Part II of the 13th August 1948 resolution."

The results of the meetings and conversations with the representatives separately on this approach led the United Nations Representative to the conclusion that agreement was not possible at that time between the two Governments on a truce agreement based solely on Part II of the 13 August 1948 resolution and it appeared to him that the same difficulties that existed as early as 1949 were still the main obstacles in the way of carrying out the commitments embodied in Part II.

The United Nations Representative did not feel he could continue this approach as the figures of troops proposed by the Government of India for the withdrawal of the bulk of their Army were not such as he could sponsor with Pakistan; nor were the figures suggested by Pakistan negotiable with India.

It was clear to the United Nations Representative, that this approach would not lead to any fruitful result and, in accordance with the terms of reference agreed upon between the two Governments for the Conference, further consideration of the twelve proposals ensued.

(2) Further consideration of the 12 proposals

As the United Nations Representative has pointed out and as it was borne out in the last discussions in the Security Council, the main problem under the programme of demilitarization was the question dealt with under paragraph 7 of his 12 proposals, that is to say, the number and character of forces to remain on each side of the cease-fire line at the end of a period of demilitarization.

The United Nations Representative, having met separately with the representatives of India and Pakistan to discuss with each their positions on this important matter, presented on 14 February 1953 to the two representatives for discussion, proposals which contained, *inter alia*, in paragraph 7 specific figures for the forces on each side of the cease-fire line at the end of the period of demilitarization. The revised text of paragraph 7 read as follows:

"Agree that the demilitarization shall be carried out in such a way that at the end of the period referred to in paragraph 6 above the situation will be:

A. On the Pakistan side of the cease-fire line:

(i) the tribesmen and Pakistan nationals not normally resident therein who had entered the State for the purpose of fighting will have been withdrawn;

(ii) the Pakistan troops will have been withdrawn from the State;

(iii) large-scale disbanding and disarming of the Azad Kashmir forces will have taken place; so that at the end of the period of demilitarization there shall remain an armed force of 6,000. This force will have been separated from the administrative and operational command of the Pakistan High Command in accordance with paragraph 9. It will have no armour or artillery.

B. On the Indian side of the cease-fire line:

(i) the bulk of the Indian forces in the State will have been withdrawn;

(ii) further withdrawals or reductions, as the case may be, of the Indian and State armed forces remaining in the State after the completion of the operation referred to in B (i) above will have been carried out; so that at the end of the period of demilitarization there shall be an Indian

army force of 21,000 including State armed forces. This force will be without armour or artillery."

The positions of the representatives of India and Pakistan on these proposals were set forth in their communications of 17 February 1953 and, in substance, stated the following:

India

(1) The Government of India had no comments on paragraphs 1 to 6, 8 and the provisional clause.

(2) As regards paragraph 7 the Government of India had no comments on A (i) and (ii) and B (i) and (ii). On the question of Azad Kashmir forces referred to in paragraph A (iii) the Government of India was unable to agree to the retention of any military forces in the so-called Azad Kashmir territory.

(3) In the opinion of the Government of India the function of preventing violations of the cease-fire line on the Azad Kashmir side could be effectively performed by a civil armed force to the formation of which they had already agreed (2,000 armed, 2,000 unarmed). However, in order to meet the United Nations Representative's point regarding the necessity of an adequate force to prevent infringement of the cease-fire line from the Azad Kashmir side, the Government of India was willing to agree to some increase in the numbers of the proposed Civil Armed force and also to the equipment of the armed section of this force with such weapons as may be considered suitable to assure the satisfactory discharge of this function.

(4) As regarded paragraph 9, the Government of India pointed out:

(i) that the so-called Azad Kashmir Government should not be allowed to function in this area either collectively or individually through its ministers.

(ii) that all officials appointed by the Pakistan Government should cease to function.

(iii) that no connexion should be maintained between the local authority and the Pakistan Government.

(iv) that the administration should be conducted under the surveillance of the United Nations Representative by local officials who could be relied upon to discharge their duties effectively and impartially with strict regard to the needs and conditions of a fair and impartial plebiscite.

(5) As regarded paragraph 10, the Government of India reaffirmed the views stated in paragraph 2 of the memorandum annexed as Appendix V to the fourth report of the United Nations Representative, that was:

"The Government of India's view is that the Plebiscite Administrator could properly function only after (i) the process of demilitarization is completed and the United Nations Representative is satisfied that peaceful conditions have been restored and (ii) the local authorities are recognized and are functioning on the Pakistan side of the cease-fire line under the surveillance of the United Nations Representative. In the interests of agreement, however, the Government of India would be prepared to agree to his induction on the last day of the period of demilitarization provided that it was completed according to plan and was exhaustive so that the Plebiscite Administrator would, as regarded the forces remaining in the State after demilitarization was fully implemented, be concerned only with their disposition."

(6) In regard to paragraph 11 the Government of India made clear that it always had understood the term "disposal" in paragraph 4 (a) of the UNCIP resolution of 5 January 1949 to mean "disposition" and not reduction or withdrawal.

Pakistan

(1) Paragraph 7 of the proposals contravened the Security Council's resolution of 23 December 1952.

(2) In the debate that preceded the adoption by the Security Council of its resolution of 23 December 1952

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the members of the Council were at pains to affirm and explain that the bracket of figures of troops proposed in the Anglo-US draft resolution on Kashmir had been arrived at after taking into account the military needs of both the Indian occupied areas of the State and Azad Kashmir. No reasons had been advanced by the United Nations Representative to justify any change. The figures of troops for the Indian side of the cease-fire line have been arbitrarily raised, without any justification, to 21,000. The Pakistan delegation was convinced that if 21,000 Indian and State Armed forces were allowed to remain on the Indian side of the cease-fire line as against only 6,000 Azad Kashmir forces, the security of the Azad Kashmir area would be put in serious jeopardy.

(3) The figures now suggested by the United Nations Representative would destroy the safeguard contained in paragraph (8) of the twelve proposals (and already accepted by both sides) that "the demilitarization shall be carried out in such a way as to involve no threat to the cease-fire agreement either during or after the period" of demilitarization.

(4) The figures now proposed have avowedly no other object than to meet India's wishes with regard to the number of forces to be retained on its side of the cease-fire line. This fails to take into account the corresponding needs of security on the Azad Kashmir side of the cease-fire line. This process of continuous yielding ground in face of Indian intransigence amounts in effect to an endorsement and abetment of the Indian attitude. It was a clear indication to India that its sustained attitude of intransigence would ultimately procure the formulation of a Truce Agreement on its own terms.

After thorough consideration of these communications and further conversations with the representatives of India and Pakistan, the United Nations Representative felt that there was no ground left at that stage on which to continue the Conference and therefore, in agreement with the two representatives, he decided to conclude it.

The Value of an Agreement

A. Values to the People of the State

The people of the State of Jammu and Kashmir have waited over four years for the fulfilment of the promise of a plebiscite under the two agreed UNCT resolutions. The people in the East and the West look for an example from the top of the subcontinent in Jammu and Kashmir, that an agreement for a plebiscite will soon be fulfilled for and by the people of this most ancient, beautiful and historic state. Renewed physical and spiritual energies would be released by an agreed settlement of this dispute.

The meaning of this new freedom would shine across the earth from the top-most roof of the world, brightening the lives of the people in the hills and valleys, fields and forests, the homes and schools, mosques and temples, the shops and workplaces, beckoning near and far to all people struggling to be free.

B. Values to the People of the Two Nations

An agreement would have many positive values to India and Pakistan:

(1) The two Governments, without prejudice to their conceptions and claims, would by the reconciliation of their long maintained differences over Kashmir, take a decisive and co-operative step forward, rather than continuing to the point of possible catastrophe, a disagreement over the ways for the carrying out of these four-year-old agreements which provide for the determination by the people of Jammu and Kashmir of their relation to India and Pakistan.

(2) The dispute over Kashmir would be settled by a constructive peace and not by force of arms or the attrition of years, with their attendant international bitterness and their running sores drawing off the higher interests and energies of two peoples.

(3) Settlement of the Kashmir dispute might contribute to the settlement of the disputes over evacuee property and waterways, with all the meaning of these steps to the morale, and the productive programmes of these historic peoples, most ancient on the earth, yet youngest in the hopes and dreams of their new liberation, and most resolute in the faith and courage of their dedicated leadership.

C. Values to the People of the World

The universal yearning of the people for peace is today confronted with the high potentials of the world for war. The peoples of the sub-continent have an unprecedented opportunity for providing the leadership, setting the example and mayhap turning the direction of human affairs, away from the tendencies to self-destruction, to the ways of self-determination, peace and co-operation. The settlement of the Kashmir dispute, with its implications for the 400,000,000 people of the sub-continent, might set in motion the beginnings of a counter chain reaction of peace, production and hope. The warmth of human brotherhood may yet melt away the hard divisions between the peoples in their hopes for freedom and peace in the world.

Instead of the United Nations Representative continuing to report differences to the Security Council, may the leadership of over 400,000,000 people, with the good will and assistance of the United Nations, join in negotiating and reporting an agreement on Kashmir and thereby light a torch along the difficult path of the people's pilgrimage toward peace.

Out of the East, the cradle of civilizations and the home of great spiritual faiths, would come again the example to the nations and the call to all peoples for demilitarization, self-determination, and co-operation in great programmes for education, health, production, and peace on all the earth.

National Security Interests In St. Lawrence Seaway

White House press release dated April 24

President Eisenhower on April 24 sent the following letters to Senator Alexander Wiley, Chairman, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, and Thomas C. Buchanan, Chairman, Federal Power Commission:

DEAR SENATOR WILEY:

At my request, the National Security Council has considered the national security interests in the Saint Lawrence-Great Lakes Seaway Project. The Council has advised me:

1. Early initiation and completion of the Saint Lawrence-Great Lakes Seaway is in the interest of national security.

2. The United States should promptly take whatever action may be appropriate to clear the way for commencement of the project, whether by Canada alone, or, now or as may be later developed, by Canada and the United States jointly.

3. It is desirable that the United States participate in the construction of the Seaway; the extent of and limitations upon such participation to be the subject of separate determination by authority other than the Council.

The Council's findings and recommendations

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have my approval; and I propose now to discuss with the Cabinet the extent of and limitations upon United States participation in the project.

I am forwarding a copy of this letter to the Chairman of the Federal Power Commission for his information and such action as he may deem appropriate.

DEAR MR. BUCHANAN:

Enclosed for your information and such action as you may deem appropriate is a copy of a letter which I have sent today to Senator Alexander Wiley, Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate. The letter contains a statement of the views and recommendations of the National Security Council on the Saint Lawrence-Great Lakes Seaway Project.

Current Legislation on Foreign Policy

Chancellor Konrad Adenauer. Hearing Before the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, 83d Cong., 1st sess., informal meeting of the Committee with Chancellor Konrad Adenauer of the Federal Republic of Germany. April 9, 1953. 8 pp.

Foreign Policy Address of the President of the United States delivered before the American Society of Newspaper Editors, April 16, 1953. S. Doc. 39, 83d Cong., 1st sess. 6 pp.

Agreements Relating to the Status of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Armed Forces, and Military Headquarters. Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, 83d Cong., 1st sess., on Status of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Armed Forces, and Military Headquarters. April 7 and 8, 1953. 117 pp.

Eighth Report Concerning the Yugoslav Emergency Relief Assistance Program. Letter From Secretary of State Transmitting the Eighth Report Concerning the Yugoslav Emergency Relief Assistance Program, covering the period September 16, 1952, through December 15, 1952, pursuant to Section 6 of Public Law 897, 81st Cong. (The Yugoslav Emergency Relief Assistance Act of 1950). H. Doc. 128, 83d Cong., 1st sess. 2 pp.

THE DEPARTMENT

Resignation

Reed Harris as Deputy Administrator of International Information Administration, effective April 24, 1953.

Curtailement of IIA Staff

Press release 209 dated April 22

Robert L. Johnson, Administrator of the International Information Administration (IIA), said on April 22 that approximately 830 people both here and abroad will be dropped from the payroll of the overseas information and educational exchange program, and around 160 unfilled positions will be abolished. Mr. Johnson said he was taking this action to comply with the economy directive issued by the Bureau of the Budget.

Of the total number of IIA employees to receive termi-

nation notices, approximately 60 hold positions in Washington, 399 are working in the Voice of America and supporting services in New York, and the others, which include local nationals, are employed by press, motion pictures, Uris Libraries, and the exchange-of-persons program located in Europe, the Near East, the Far East, and Latin America.

Because of this economy move, the IIA Administrator said, the Voice of America will reduce the number of broadcasts to the free world by eliminating the following language broadcasts: French, Portuguese, Spanish to Latin America, Hebrew, Malayan, and Thai. In addition, the English broadcast service will be reduced from a worldwide total of 5 hours and 45 minutes daily to 30 minutes a day.

Broadcasts to the Iron Curtain countries will be maintained and relay facilities now nearing completion overseas will strengthen the signal in certain critical areas. The number of language broadcasts originating from the Munich Program Center, which now include Russian, Polish, Lithuanian, Estonian, Bulgarian, and Hungarian, will be increased.

In Latin America as well as Portugal, France, and Israel, local broadcasting stations will continue to receive some VOA features and commentaries by means of discs, tapes, and scripts.

Since program services to the free world will be reduced, the bimonthly world program schedule, with a million and a half circulation, which has been published in English and 10 other languages, will be discontinued.

This move, according to Mr. Johnson, is a contraction to establish the essentials of a revitalized, flexible, and hard-hitting program designed to achieve maximum effectiveness.

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Releases may be obtained from the Office of the Special Assistant for Press Relations, Department of State, Washington 25, D. C.

Press releases issued prior to Apr. 27 which appear in this issue of the BULLETIN are Nos. 204 of Apr. 20, 209 of Apr. 22, and 213 of Apr. 25.

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*215	4/27	Colligan: U.S. and the foreign student
*216	4/27	Taft: Irish-American relations
†217	4/27	U.S. properties in China
†218	4/27	Signatories of wheat agreement
†219	4/27	Reed Mission to Pakistan
†220	4/28	Dulles: Japanese treaty anniversary
221	4/28	Murphy: Assignment to UNC
†222	4/28	Further wheat agreement signatories
†223	4/29	New <i>Foreign Relations</i> volume
†224	4/29	Tax negotiations with Australia
225	4/29	Dulles: Results of NATO meeting
†226	5/1	Administrative Council (IRU)
†227	5/1	Dulles: Polish constitution
*228	5/1	Vice Admiral Wright visits Jordan
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†230	5/1	Return of German art libraries
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†Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

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